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Abstract
The article discusses the looming ASEAN (Association of 
Southeast Asia Nations) regional architecture as it faces a puzzling 
question on how the region is moving towards a deepening 
economic integration beyond its ASEAN Economic Community 
(AEC) scheme. It addresses the issue in the context of the 
association?s wider economic integration that is in parallel with 
its major member economies participation in regional production 
networks (RPNs). Automotive and electronics are selected as sectors 
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in which firms originated from the +3 neighboring East Asian 
countries (China, Japan and Korea) –along with their suppliers, 
local partners and subsidiaries operated in the hosting ASEAN 
countries? are the major drivers. 
Dynamic trade setting and value chain structures resulted 
from deepening participation in the automotive and electronics 
RPNs by ASEAN major economies (namely Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Thailand) have paved the way for further 
ASEAN+3 regionalization. ASEAN+3 trade in the two sectors 
suggests a case in point that signifi es the functioning of both intra 
(within ASEAN) and inter-regional (between ASEAN and its +3 
partners) economic integration. Benefitting from such a trade 
setting, firms and other relevant stakeholders in the two sectors 
undertake strategies to capture value added featuring hierarchical 
and market value chain structures for automotive and electronics 
respectively. A typical ?smiley curve? is less represented as value 
creation spans across different level of downstream, midstream 
and upstream business activities, and as firms –alongside their 
suppliers, local partners and subsidiaries? strategically respond 
to the ASEAN major hosting governments ? investment and 
industrial policy scheme.
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A.  BACKGROUND
Beyond its 27th summit in Kuala Lumpur (November 18th - 22nd 2015) 
that marked the official launch of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asia 
Nations) Community (due by December 31st 2015), ASEAN regional archi-
tecture should be in a question mark, particularly as to how its ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC) pillar will be progressed further. Relevance of 
CEPT-AFTA (Common Effective Preferential Tariffs of ASEAN Free Trade 
Area agreement) scheme is worth scrutinized as most manufactured goods 
have been exchanged among ASEAN member countries at near-zero tariff 
rates. As of February 2015, average tariff rate of overall ASEAN-10 mem-
bers is 0.23% (for a number of 98,821 tariff lines) where the ASEAN-6 has 
a mere 0.03% average tariff rate (for a number of 60,925 tariff lines) and 
the ASEAN-CLMV has a record of 0.55 average tariff rate (for a number of 
37,896 tariff lines)3?. 
Despite its successful trade-creation effects on promoting intra-ASE-
AN trade4?, the question lingers on how firms and other relevant stake-
holders in the member economies would actually benefit from deepened 
economic integration under the current scheme. A study by Okabe and 
Urata (2013) maintains that tariff elimination under AFTA-CEPT scheme 
has resulted in an increased intra-ASEAN trade activity in a wide range 
of products5?. However, as suggested by Chapponniere and Lautier (2016), 
 3?  The original agreement (i.e. the Agreement on Common Effective Preferential Tariff 
(CEPT) Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area/AFTA) was signed by relevant ministers 
of the six ASEAN member nations (ASEAN-6), i.e. Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malay-
sia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand during the 4th ASEAN Summit (on January 
28th 1992 in Singapore) covering all manufactured goods (i.e. to include capital goods, pro-
cessed agricultural products and those products failing outside the definition of agricultur-
al products) to have 0-5% tariff rate reductions (within ASEAN members, based on each 
national schedules). The ASEAN-6 tariff reduction schedules were initially targeted for the 
commencement of AFTA by the year of 2008, but then ware revised during the ASEAN 
Ministerial Meetings in September 1994 and July 1998 that the target was advanced to 
2002. Major and significant revision on AFTA-CEPT schedules was finally undertaken un-
der the ATIGA (ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement) signed in February 2009 that mandat-
ed 0% tariff rate for all products in the Inclusion List (IL) for ASEAN-6 by 2010 and ASE-
AN-CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) by 2015 (ASEAN Secretariat 2016).
 4?  See for example ASEAN Integration Report 2015, ASEAN Integration Monitoring Report 
2013, and Okabe and Urata (2013) for more detailed assessment on the accomplishment. 
 5?  The study exposes the changing patterns of intra-ASEAN trade flows where intra-ASEAN 
import share increased (16% in 1990 to over 24% in 2004, then stayed around that level) 
and by contrast intra-ASEAN export share declined (22% in 1994 to around 18% in 1998, 
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the scheme offers limited spread between the AFTA-CEPT preferential 
tariff and the WTO-MFN (World Trade Organization-Most Favored Na-
tion) tariff which explain general attitude of firms (as exporters) who con-
sider that AFTA tariff gain is not worthwhile as it is smaller than its cost 
of transactions6?. 
The article nevertheless suggests that those dynamic patterns of in-
tra-ASEAN trade would correspond to changes in production networks be-
tween ASEAN and its key trading partners7?. In terms of achieving a re-
gional production base8?, the changing intra-ASEAN trade patterns 
then increased gradually to reach 20–22% in the late 2000s, but did not exceed the corre-
sponding import share). There is a rising trend of intra-ASEAN export share for processed 
goods in the 2000s. Declining trends of intra-ASEAN export shares are clearly distin-
guished for parts and components and capital goods, while primary goods and consumption 
goods remain more or less constant through the 1985–2010 period. Moreover, Okabe and 
Urata (2013) found that the changing patterns of intra-ASEAN import shares differ con-
siderably from those for exports. Intra-ASEAN imports of parts and components and capi-
tal goods contributed to the rise of the intra-ASEAN import share from the early 1990s to 
the mid-2000s. The share for parts and components increased from 15.5% to 27.7% over 
the period from 1990 to 2002 and the share for capital goods rose from 7.7% to 21.4% dur-
ing the 1990–2000 period. However, these shares began to decline slowly in the mid-2000s. 
One observes a rather noticeable increase in the intra-ASEAN import share for processed 
materials from the mid-1990s until the mid-2000s. The import share for the consumption 
goods increased slowly over the 1985–2010 period. Contrastingly, the share for primary 
goods declined notably from the mid-1980s until 2000 before rising very slowly. As a result 
of these changes, the gaps between the intra-ASEAN import shares for these categories of 
products (consumption goods, processed materials, parts and components, primary goods, 
and capital goods) narrowed over the 1985–2010 period. The gap between the highest and 
lowest shares was more than 20 percentage points in 1985 but declined to less than 15 per-
centage points in 2010.
 6?  As quoted by Chaponniere and Lautiere (2016), surveys carried out in the 1990s revealed 
that only 1.5 percent of intra-ASEAN exporters benefited from AFTA tariff exemptions 
(Nesadurai, 2003), and an Asian Development Bank (ADB) study revealed that only 22 
percent of firms used the CEPT mechanism in 2006 (Cinievski, 2010). 
 7?  A couple of indications are suggested by Okabe and Urata (2013): (1) increasing trend in 
the intra-ASEAN import shares in parts and components and capital goods indicate the 
formation of regional production networks in ASEAN, under which procurement of these 
intermediate products is sourced within ASEAN; and (2) recognizing that China has be-
come an increasingly important destination of ASEAN exports in parts and components 
and capital goods, a declining trend in intra-ASEAN exports in these intermediate goods 
indicate the presence of a production network involving ASEAN and China.
 8?  Establishing a single market and production base is one of the AEC major characteristics 
and elements which consists of free flow of goods, services, investment, capital and skilled 
labor (AEC Blueprint 2008-2105) with 12 priority sectors to be kept in mind, i.e. agro-
based goods, air transport, automotive products, e-ASEAN (including ICT equipment), 
electronics goods, fisheries, health care products, rubber-based goods, textiles and clothing, 
tourism, wood-based products (ASEAN Bali Concord II Declaration 2003) and logistics 
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(particularly in products related to manufacturing) offer a new insight in 
comprehending and developing the ASEAN hosting governments? foreign 
direct investments (FDIs) promotion and industrial policy schemes, re-
gional production networks (RPNs) and regional value chains (RVCs) that 
have been expanded alongside its neighboring East Asian partners, i.e. the 
+3 countries (China, Japan and Korea)9?. ASEAN economies deepening in-
tegration into RPNs/RVCs is predominantly apparent in the two leading 
manufacturing sectors, i.e. automotive and electronics, despite insignifi-
cant use of CEPT-AFTA mechanism by firms in the two sectors10?.
The article therefore aims to understand ASEAN economic integra-
tion, particularly in the context of ASEAN+311? regionalization, by looking 
at its major member countries (i.e. Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thai-
(added at the 2006 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting).
 9?  Prevailing comprehension on East and Southeast Asian production networks relies on 
combination of market and institutional-led factors where both multinational companies 
(MNCs) decisions (to locate and coordinate their fragmented production processes and val-
ue chains activities) and hosting government policy directives (in designing trade and in-
vestment policies to encourage in-bound FDIs for the purpose of import-substitution, ex-
port promotion and the elimination of domestic gaps in the value chain of production) play 
the key roles in developing the networks. The 1985 Plaza Accord which triggered apprecia-
tion of yen was considered as the major corner stone marking the beginning of internation-
al production networks in East Asia following decisions made by leading Japanese multi-
national companies (MNCs) to relocate their production bases to Southeast Asian 
countries (particularly Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand) seeking for lower production 
and labor costs (see e.g. Cheewatrakoolpong, Sabhasri, and Bunditwattanawong (2013) for 
elaborate discussion on the emergence and advancement of East and Southeast Asia pro-
duction networks).
 10?  Apart from its facilitating role for the regional export of agricultural products and pro-
cessed materials, tariff elimination under CEPT-AFTA scheme promotes imports in electri-
cal machinery and automobile equipment for which regional production networks have 
been set up (Okabe and Urata 2013). However, as previously indicated,  CEPT-AFTA mech-
anism was utilized by only 22 percent of firms in 2006 (ADB study as quoted by Cinievski, 
2010 in Chaponniere and Lautier, 2015). Yet the share for Thailand rose up by 26.7 percent 
in 2008 (Chirathivat, quoted in ADB 2012) with large variations by sector as follows: 28 
percent in the automobile industry (due to locational factor as Toyota?s regional hub) and 
very low for electronics due to removal of customs tariffs on information technology (IT) 
products (Chaponniere and Lautier, 2015).
 11?  ASEAN+3 denotes the 10 ASEAN member countries and their 3 neighboring East Asian 
countries, i.e. China, Japan and Korea.
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land and Vietnam) participation in the automotive12? and electronics13? 
RPNs. It comprehends regionalization not only as stages towards further 
trade liberalization, but also as a phenomenon that is significantly affect-
ed by changes in its lingering trade setting, i.e. the production networks 
and value chains. Such changes would in turn suggest distinctive value 
chains structures, FDI promotion and industrial policy schemes offered by 
the hosting governments. By such a postulation, it is understood that post-
AEC integration is (and should be fostered) in parallel with the ASEAN 
economies deepening participation in the RPNs, and that ASEAN+3 re-
gionalization depends accordingly on how firms and the host governments 
advance value addition activities as they benefit from (and eventually deal 
with) changes in the production networks. 
 12?  The article defines automotive sector as an economic area covering an industry that com-
prises a wide range of companies or firms along with their supply chains as well as other 
organizations involved in the design, development, manufacturing, marketing and selling 
of motor vehicles. In terms of commodities traded within the sector and/or industry, it is 
mainly categorized under HS (Harmonized System) Commodity Code number 87 (Vehicles 
other than railway, tramway) and/or SITC (Standard International Trade Classification) 
categorized under Transport Equipment.
 13?  Defining electronics sector and/or industry is a daunting task given its complexity and a 
wide range of products to be covered and categorized under the term of ?electronics.? In its 
scientific term, electronics itself refer to electrical circuits that involve active electrical 
components, such as vacuum tubes, transistors, diodes and integrated circuits, and associ-
ated passive electrical components and interconnection technologies. Commonly, electronic 
devices contain circuitry consisting primarily or exclusively of active semiconductors sup-
plemented with passive elements; such a circuit, and is described as an electronic circuit. 
Hence, at macro-level analysis, the article delineate electronics as mainly referring to 
products traded under HS Commodity Code number 85 (Electrical, electronic equipment) 
and/or SITC categorized under Electrical and Optical Equipment. However, at micro-level 
analysis, the definition of electronics may varied considerably due to indistinct categoriza-
tion of contemporary products and manufacturing processes in the industry related to elec-
tronics, thus studying specific firm such as Panasonic would require a very careful analy-
sis on its products development and segmentation. Sturgeon and Kawakami (2010) offer a 
useful categorization of the electronics industry based on its main products output, i.e. (1) 
Computers; (2) Computer Peripherals and Other Office Equipment; (3) Consumer Elec-
tronics; (4) Server and Storage Devices; (5) Networking; (6) Automobile Electronics; (7) 
Medical Electronics; (8) Industrial Electronics; and (9) Military and Aerospace Electronics. 
Referring to the categorization, the article?s micro-level analysis –that is based on firms-
level assessment on companies such as Panasonic? primarily falls under category number 
(3) Consumer Electronics. The term ?consumer electronics? is therefore preferably used in 
the article, i.e. to cover the micro firm-level analysis as in the case on Panasonic. Likewise 
the term ?electrical (home) appliances? also resembles similarity of consumer electronics 
category.
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B.  QUESTIONS TO ADDRESS
Considering such background and intention, the following guiding 
questions are put across as follows:
1.   How do contemporary changes in the regional automotive and electron-
ics production networks signify ASEAN+3 regionalization? What char-
acterize the changes, i.e. in terms of trade pattern and trends in value 
added?
2.   How do the changes characterize regional value chains structures in 
the two sectors? What responses are engaged by firms and other rele-
vant stakeholders to deal with such changes?
3.   In light of such changes, how do the hosting ASEAN governments fur-
ther develop FDI promotion and industrial policy schemes? What are 
key lessons learnt?
C.  ARGUMENT TO PROPOSE
To address the questions, the article offers a conceptual framework 
that is based on an alternative approach to the existing theorization on re-
gional economic integration and is thus focused on evolving concepts of 
global value chain and global production network (GVC/GPN) and their 
embedded notion of value addition. ASEAN+3 regionalization is hence un-
derstood as a phenomenon linked to byproduct setting of GVC/GPN –i.e. 
regional production networks and regional value chains (RPNs/RVCs)? in 
which automotive and electronics serve major driving roles. The following 
sets of argument are proposed in line with the framework and elaborated 
correspondingly to the above-mentioned guiding questions:
1.   The automotive and electronics RPNs –driven mostly by lead firms and 
1st tier suppliers whose home countries are of those the +3 partner 
countries? offer the following empirical (macro-level) setting for ASE-
AN+3 regionalization:
a.   Trade between major ASEAN economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, Sin-
gapore, Thailand and Vietnam, hereafter called as ASEAN5) and 
their +3 East Asian trading partners (China, Japan and Korea) in 
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automotive and electronics-related commodities (i.e. under Harmo-
nized System (HS) Code 87-vehicles other than railway, tramway, 
HS Code 85-electrical, electronic equipment, Standard Internation-
al Trade Classification (SITC) C34T35-transport equipment and 
SITC-C30T33-electrical-optical equipment) represent both dynamic 
trade pattern and trends in value added.
b.   By total value of trade, Japan and China lead the ASEAN5+3 auto-
motive and electronics trade respectively in the last five years. 
Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia are the major trading partners 
of Japan in automotive (mainly in parts and components), while 
China?s major trading partners in electronics are Singapore, Ma-
laysia and Thailand (principally in electronics integrated circuits 
(ICs) and micro assemblies) and also recently Vietnam (in electrical 
apparatus for line telephony and telegraph). In terms of major ex-
port destination and import origin, ASEAN5+3 trade in the two 
sectors indicate up-to-date positions of the +3 countries, particular-
ly in the cases of Japan and China where the former keeps its dom-
inance in the inter-regional automotive trade and the later have 
put its ascendency in the inter-regional electronics one.
c.   In terms of value added created, the automotive sector reveals Chi-
na-Japan trade capturing most of the foreign content of exported 
products, i.e. by more than five times that of Japan-Thailand and 
China-Korea trades. The added value created from domestic con-
tent of exported products for the automotive, however, is mostly 
captured within the +3 countries trade, with Indonesia-Thailand 
trade is closely trailing behind. Meanwhile in terms of value added 
captured, the electronics sector exposes superior China-Japan trade 
as it generates most of the foreign content of exported products by 
more than six times that of Korea-China & Japan-Korea trades. 
The added value generated from domestic content of exported prod-
ucts for the electronics is dominated by Korea-China trade, howev-
er interregional trades (particularly between China and Malaysia 
& Singapore) is catching up more and more domestic content of ex-
ported products.
2.   At institutional (micro-level) setting, such changes implicate to firms 
strategy in capturing value added, how firms manage their relations 
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with suppliers, local partners/subsidiaries in maintaining and develop-
ing value addition activities, and how they respond to the hosting ASE-
AN governments FDI promotion and industrial policies.
a.   Responses by firms and other related stakeholders to the changes 
is characterized by value chain structures that denote: (1) a hierar-
chical network in the case of automotive sector where capturing 
added values are mostly depended on and relied upon the lead 
firm?s value addition activities, and (2) a market network in the 
case of electronics (consumer electronics) as generating added val-
ues are much more diffused and shared among the lead firm, its 
suppliers and local partners/subsidiaries.
b.   Based on micro-level analysis and two purposively selected case 
studies on Toyota (as a lead firm exemplifying automotive sector) 
and Panasonic (as a lead firm representing typical consumer elec-
tronics industry) that are both operated in ASEAN+3 RPNs, ?back 
to basic? value addition activities are preferred, i.e. firms (along 
with their supply chain and distribution networks) tend to endeav-
or efficiency not only in upstream and downstream activities (by 
capturing value added in the areas of research, development and 
design (RD&D), and marketing and services), but also in mid-
stream activities (by also capturing value added in the areas of pro-
duction and logistics).
3.   Those strategic responses by firms and the resulted value chains struc-
tures define regional value chains of the two sectors and how other re-
lated stakeholders, especially the hosting ASEAN governments, man-
age the chains both within ASEAN (intra-regional) and ASEAN+3 
(inter-regional).
a.   Intra-regionally, hosting governments of key ASEAN economies 
(Indonesia, Malaysia-Singapore and Thailand) deliver variations in 
strategies to adjust the economies to both types of value chains 
structures, i.e. by orienting the chains more domestically (in the 
case of Indonesia), spatially conjoining the chains (in the case of 
Malaysia/Singapore) and immersing the chains of the two sectors 
(in the case of Thailand).
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b.   Inter-regionally, in light of the ensuing regional value chains, three 
key policy issues are worth noticed as they cover topics on: (1) link-
ing FDI and industrial policy schemes to the value chains; (2) es-
tablishing common policy platform for human resource develop-
ment (HRD) and research, design and development (RD&D); and 
finally (3) seeking regional industrial cooperation mechanism in 
which existing ASEAN integration institutional schemes are to be 
utilized.
The following diagram –outlining the overall argument? offers styl-
ized comprehension on the resulted value chains structures (a hierarchical 
network type for automotive and a market network type for electronics) as 
they correlate and generate impacts to both levels of regional economic in-
tegration and eventually as they define the ensuing regional value chains 
(RVCs) of the two sectors.
D.  OUTLINE OF THE ARTICLE
To elaborate the argument, the remaining parts of the article are 
structured as follows. The subsequent Part E (Conceptual Framework) 
presents theoretical surveys clarifying conceptual understanding on re-
gional economic integration as seen from GPN and GVC perspectives. A 
brief backgrounder of ASEAN+3 regionalization and description of South-
east Asia?s position in contemporary GPNs are presented in next part 
(Part F). The presentation aims to offer an up-to-date assessment on ASE-
AN/Southeast Asia distinctive feature in contemporary regionalism. 
The next following parts discuss the core argument of the article con-
sisting three sections. The first section (Part G) presents macro-level trade 
setting that characterizes changes in the two sectors RPNs by displaying 
ASEAN5+3 trade pattern and trends in value added in commodities relat-
ed to automotive (HS 87 and SITC C34T35) and electronics (HS 85 and 
SITC C30T33). The second section (Part H) presents micro-level setting 
that characterizes value chains structures of the two sectors RPNs as it 
also showcases value addition activities performed by firms (as exempli-
fied in the cases of Toyota and Panasonic) and the hosting governments 
(as represented by key economies in the region: Indonesia, Malaysia, Sin-
gapore and Thailand). The third section (Part I) proposes key policy issues 
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Diagram 1: Outlining the Argument
Types of 
Value Chains 
Structure
Features and Impacts Key Policy Issues toward 
Regional Value ChainsIntra-regional 
(within ASEAN)
Inter-regional
(ASEAN+3)
Hierarchical 
Network: 
Automotive
Major Trade Nexus: 
Thailand-Indonesia*
Main Commodities 
Traded: Passenger Cars 
(HS 8703), Parts and 
Accessories (HS 8708)*
Major Trend in Value 
Added: Thailand-Indone-
sia in domestic content of 
exported products (DVA)
Host Countries Value 
Chains Strategies: (1) 
Domestically Oriented 
Chains (Indonesia); (2) 
Chains Immersion 
(Thailand)
Major Trade Nexus: 
Japan - Thailand, Indone-
sia and Malaysia
Main Commodities 
Traded: Parts and Acces-
sories (HS 8708)
Major Trend in Value 
Added: Japan-Thailand in 
foreign content of export-
ed products (FVA)
Firms Level Strategy: 
Case on Toyota 
Value added are mostly 
captured by relying upon 
the lead firm?s value 
addition activities
?
(1) FDI Promotion and 
Industrial Policy 
Linkage
 Different magnitudes 
in the host country?s 
structural problems, 
variations in policy 
design and degree of 
implementation 
 Aspiration for FDI 
promotion and indus-
trial development 
schemes that are 
oriented towards value 
added-ness
(2) HRD and RD&D Policy 
Platform
 Prerequisite for value 
added as stakeholders 
are shared common 
challenges and need 
concerted actions in 
the issues of HRD 
(technical capacity and 
vocational training) 
and RD&D
(3) Regional Industrial 
Cooperation
 ASEAN initiatives and 
facilitating roles: trade 
and industry ?clearing 
house? and enhanced 
collaboration with the 
+3 countries agencies 
(e.g. by emulating the 
Japanese HIDA best 
practices in HRD 
training network)
Market 
Network: 
Electronics/
Consumer 
Electronics
Major Trade Nexus: 
Malaysia-Singapore-
Thailand*
Main Commodities 
Traded: Electronics 
Integrated Circuits and 
Micro Assemblies (HS 
8542), TV, Video Monitors 
and Projectors (HS 8528)*
No Major Trends in Value 
Added are Indicated 
(neither in terms of FVA 
nor DVA)
Host Countries Value 
Chains Strategies: 
Spatially Conjoined 
Chains (Malaysia-Singa-
pore)
Major Trade Nexus: 
China – Singapore, 
Malaysia and Thailand 
Main Commodities 
Traded: Electronics 
Integrated Circuits and 
Micro Assemblies (HS 
8542), and more recently 
electrical apparatus for 
line telephony and 
telegraph (HS 8617)
Major Trend in Value 
Added: China-Malaysia/
Singapore DVA
Firms Level Strategy: 
Case on Panasonic
Value added are diffused 
and shared among the 
lead firm, suppliers, local 
partners and subsidiaries
?
*Note: data on these specific findings are not presented in the article as detailed presenta-
tion is previously elaborated in Arfani (2015).
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worth considering in an endeavor towards the two sectors regional value 
chains. The last part summarizes, draws and offers policy lessons and rec-
ommendations.
E.  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Late regionalization processes (including that of ASEAN and ASE-
AN+3) typically follow the prototype of that of European Union (EU)14?. 
Following the prototype however is the two contending international polit-
ical economic approaches on economic regionalism15?: the neo-functional-
ism16? and the ?inter-governmentalism.?17? The ASEAN+3 regionalization 
 14?  Emerged initially in the context of 1951 Treaty of Paris that was officially inaugurated the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), EU (through its leaders) drafted a constitu-
tion concluding its fully-fledged process of regionalization in October 2004. The 1957 Trea-
ties of Rome embarked the installment of EEC (European Economic Community), Eurat-
om and Common Market marking an era of much more fully-fledged regional integration 
among its members. In 1967, the three were merged to observe the establishment of the 
so-called EC (European Community) that in 1973 saw its first enlargement, then further 
enlargement since the 1980s onward. The 1992 Treaty of Maastricht eventually escorted 
the formation of European Union (EU) paving the way to even much more integrated so-
cial, economic, legal and political regional arrangement of the greater Europe. As of Janu-
ary 1st 1999, a common currency –Euro? was officially adopted in major parts of EU coun-
tries commencing the so-called Eurozone. 
 15?  Early theorization and conceptualization of regional economic integration processes (that 
is empirically referred to European experience) could be traced back to the works of Ernst 
B. Haas (1958) The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces (1950-57) 
(Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press) and Bela Balassa (1961) Theory of Economic Integration 
(Homewood, IL: RD Irwin). The works sparked the long-standing debate between the neo-
functionalist theories (which are typically in line with Haas and Balassa) versus the inter-
governmentalist theories (which offer counter-explanation to the phenomenon with Stan-
ley Hoffman as the major figure). The neo-functionalist argues that ?spill-over effects? of 
functional activities among countries involved in such processes would eventually gener-
ate integration of various economic and political activities. See section on ?Conceptual 
Frameworks? for further discussion on this.  
 16?  Referred mainly to the works of Haas (1958) and Balassa (1961), neo-functionalism is a 
novel synthesis of Mitrany?s theory of functionalism [David Mitrany (1943/1966) A Work-
ing Peace System (London and Chicago: RII/Quadrangle Books)] and Jean Monnet?s prag-
matic strategy of European integration. Jean Monnet?s works (as the Secretary General of 
ECSC among others) contribute to the establishment and actual operation of the modest 
association of ECSC. Begun in the ECSC era onward, the neo-functionalist considers that 
integration of various economic and political activities among member states has signified 
the roles of non-state actors: interest associations, social movement, and secretariat of the 
organization. 
 17?  Arguing against the ?spill-over effects? explanation of neo-functionalism, inter-governmen-
talist theories –under their major figure of Stanley Hoffman? developed the approach in 
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offers an interesting case where it involves a large body of governmental 
involvement in the process but also seen as copycatting the functionalist 
European model. Empirical observation –such as in the automotive and 
electronics sectors? would reveal dynamic regional integration processes 
where industries, business practitioners and other key economic players 
are deliberately attached during various official talks. The consequence of 
such processes would bring about pressures (but also opportunities) 
among ASEAN countries and its +3 partners on how decisions should be 
made, on whose benefits and costs, and finally how political mechanism 
eventually negotiates the process18?.
An alternative approach to those existing theorizations is offered to 
capture how transformation of ASEAN took place in the context of ASE-
AN+3 integration efforts. In this particular case, the nature of regionaliza-
tion is neither fully functional nor fully inter-governmental. Rather, it has 
been deeply influenced by market forces as well as inter-governmental de-
cisions designed mainly in the milieu of trade and changes in its corre-
sponding production networks as well as economic liberalization. It is 
therefore crucial to apprehend nature of those political economic relations 
–both at domestic and international levels? in acquiring the ASEAN+3 
regional integration processes. 
At this point, Global Value Chain (GVC) framework19? is applied to 
the mid of 1960s. Building on realist premises, it rejects the idea of neo-functionalism of 
loosely designed and developed integration. Rather, it proposes the idea that integration is 
a convergence of national interests. Thus the focus of regionalization is more on its major 
sets of inter-state bargains (especially inter-governmental conferences) and on the deci-
sion-making of the Councils of Ministers, rather than on the roles of the Commission, Eu-
ropean Parliament, or societal actors.
 18?  Political economic explanations on this are diverse. Hurrell (1995) identify 3 (three) differ-
ent clusters of this specific category of study: (1) the systemic theories, which emphasize 
the importance of the broader political and economic structures within which regionalist 
schemes are embedded, (2) the interdependent theories, which consist of neo-functionalism 
and neo-liberal institutionalism, and (3) the domestic-level theories, which highlight inter-
est-group politics and societal pressures over foreign economic policy. The study considers 
that this three-level categorization is an essential foundation to comprehend the dynamics 
of ASEAN+3 regional integration processes.
 19?  GVC analysis has emerged since the early 1990s as a novel methodological tool for under-
standing the dynamics of economic globalization and international trade. It is based on the 
analysis of discrete ?value chains? where input supply, production, trade and consumption 
or disposal are explicitly and (at least to some extent) coherently linked. GVC discussion 
has revolved around two analytical issues: how GVC are governed (in the context of a larg-
er institutional framework) and how upgrading or downgrading takes place along GVCs. 
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comprehend the ASEAN+3 regional economic integration by focusing on 
its production networks and commodity chains (IDE JETRO and WTO 
2011, UNCTAD 2013). Special attention has then been given to the re-
gion?s manufacturing industries following the achievement of its automo-
tive and electronics sectors integration to the global networks (Humphrey 
and Memedovic 2003, JAMA 2013, Sturgeon and Kawakami 2010, Ueki 
2013). The two sectors are considered as ?success stories? given relatively 
significant roles of domestic suppliers and subsidiaries in value addition 
activities taken by Japanese lead firms (Kawakami 2008, Kuroiwa and 
Heng 2008).
The region?s gradual integration to the global production network 
(GPN) that eventually began in the 1980s has paved the way to the devel-
opment of its regional growth zones serving as a catalyst for the two sec-
tors20?. As previously described, the year of 1994 has marked the region?s 
crucial move toward deeper integration by kick-offing the ASEAN Free 
Trade Area (AFTA) agreement which was then followed by series of inter-
regional free trade agreements (FTAs) with the region?s major trading 
partners including particularly of China, Japan and Korea as a finale for 
the two industries incorporation to the GPN. Contemporary GVC and 
GPN practices are originated from and hence a part of long-debated con-
cept on ?economic regionalism.? The debate refers to the effects of trade 
agreements among countries on their larger economic context, i.e. whether 
such agreements would create or divert economic benefits towards its 
GVC institutional framework identifies how local, national and international conditions 
and policies shape the globalization in each stage of the value chain (Gereffi and Fernan-
dez-Stark 2011).
 20?  While the concept of GVCs explores vertical and linear sequences of events along the 
chains, the concept of global production network –featured mostly by complex yet systemic 
relationships and interrelations between firms? deals with complex network structures in 
which there are intricate links (horizontal, diagonal as well as vertical) forming multi-di-
mensional, multi-layered structures of economic activities (Kuroiwa and Heng 2008). Typi-
cal organizational structures of a production network consist of global flagships (played by 
mostly multinational lead firms which are at the heart of a network) and local suppliers 
(which are characteristically featured based on their higher tier and lower tier positions in 
a network). Higher tier suppliers serve an intermediary role between lead firms and local 
suppliers. They usually have direct access to lead firms for negotiation and decisions over 
production-related activities. Lower tier suppliers are employed as ?price breakers? and ?ca-
pacity buffers? (which could be dropped at short notice) with no direct access to lead firms 
(Kuroiwa and Heng 2008).
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member and non-member countries21?. Emphasize is thus put more on the 
?zero-sum? nature of regional economic integration where participating 
and non-participating countries alike are struggling to pursue ?limited? 
economic benefits of trade agreements.
1.  GVC and GPN Concepts
Introduction of GVC and GPN concepts –which immediately followed 
the concept of Global Commodity Chains (GCCs), discussed initially by 
Hopkins and Wallerstein (1986, 1994), and then elaborated thoroughly in 
the wake of massive economic globalization in 1990s by Gereffi (1994, 
1995, 1996)? has redirected the debate on economic regionalism beyond 
traditional ?state-centric? approach which relies on country-to-country 
trade performance. GVC and GPN practices –which are mostly operated 
under lasting (regional) trade agreements? have shifted the debate over 
whether developing a ?positive-sum? scheme among participating parties 
in an integrated economic region should be the main concern. It thus 
broadens focus of the debate by encompassing non-state parties (particu-
larly those of lead firms and their supply chains network) which are pro-
posed in the later studies on GVC and GPN practices, such as indicated in 
Humphrey and Schmitz (2000), Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark (2001), 
Schmitz (2003), and Sturgeon (2008)22?.
Theoretical strands resulted from those early GVC and GPN concep-
tualization are focused on the analysis of value chain governance struc-
tures (Gereffi 1994, Gereffi et al 2005 and Sturgeon 2009), relational net-
work configurations (Dicken at al 2001, Henderson et al 2002, and Yeung 
2005), and industrial upgrading and the strategic coupling of clusters and 
 21?  Viner (1950) coined the terms of ?trade creation? and ?trade diversion? to describe those ef-
fects of the formation of free trade agreement. Referring to recent phenomenon of regional 
trade agreements (RTAs), Baldwin (2004) recapped the debate in its more contemporary 
trade context as of whether RTAs are stepping stones or stumbling blocks of the multilat-
eral trading system. 
 22?  GVC and GPN are conceptually developed mainly in the studies of economic geography, 
economic sociology, development studies, regional studies, international economics and in-
ternational business. Gereffi (1994) and Humphrey (1995) are among the pioneer works of 
GVC conceptualization, which then followed by works of Bair and Gereffi (2001), Gibbon 
(2001), Humphrey and Schmitz (2002), Sturgeon (2002), and Gereffi, Humphrey and Stur-
geon (2005). The so-called Manchester School of Economic Geographers, meanwhile, began 
conceptualizing GPN as early as of 2000s. They consist of, among others, Dicken et al 
(2001), Henderson et al (2002), Coe et al (2004, 2008), and Yeung (2009). 
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regions (Humphrey and Schmitz et al 2002, Smith et al 2002, Coe at al 
2004, Yeung 2009 and MacKinnon 2012). Nevertheless, as suggested by 
Yeung and Coe (2015), conceptual framework in the GVC research has 
been characterized by its dyadic and static conception of industrial govern-
ance, its relative neglect of territorial organization, and its failure to theo-
rize competitive dynamics and evolutionary processes of ?multi-commodi-
ty? and ?multi-industry? production networks. It is in response to such 
limitation of GVC research framework that the so-called GPN 1.0 frame-
work was then proposed23?.
Much more dynamic changes in GPN practices, especially during the 
past decade, has made GPN 1.0 obsolete in terms of how firms and other 
actors or stakeholders in a production network survive and sustain de-
spite uncertain market conditions (re: since particularly the global finan-
cial turmoil of 2007-8 and it prolonged global market slumps). GPN 2.0 
framework was then suggested as a more ambitious round of theoretical 
innovation that seeks to break signify new conceptual ground and to in-
form subsequent rounds of empirical research (Yeung and Coe 2015)24?.
 23?  Developed chiefly under the studies of economic geography and international political 
economy, GPN 1.0 emphasizes the complex firm networks and territorial institutions in-
volved in all economic activity, and how these are structured both organizationally and ge-
ographically (Yeung and Coe 2015). Development of GPN 1.0 framework aims at providing 
a more generally applicable conceptualization of the GPN (Henderson et al 1999, 2002). 
Gaining influential role as a heuristic framework in economic geography research and the 
wider social sciences (Hess and Yeung 2006b, Coe, Hess and Dicken 2008, Coe 2009, 2012, 
and Neilson, Pritchard and Yeung 2014), GPN 1.0 proposed a theoretical claim that re-
frames previous GVC-GPN debates, i.e. away from industry-level generalizations, towards 
a more dynamic theory of GPN by focusing on the structural competitive dynamics and ac-
tor-specific strategies shaping the network and their organizational configuration within 
and across different industries and localities. Under GPN 1.0 framework, GPN is defined 
as an organizational arrangement comprising interconnected economic and non-economic 
actors coordinated by a global lead firm and producing goods or services across multiple 
geographic locations for worldwide markets. It therefore specifies ?actors? as different 
types of firms as well as non-firms ones (such as the state, international organizations, la-
bor groups, consumers, civil society organizations) in diverse localities. Thus GPN 1.0 ana-
lytical focus is: (1) actors; (2) their organizational relationships (that constitute GPN in dif-
ferent industries, with a lead firm being a central, necessary prerequisite); and (3) those 
multiple locations that are bound together by economic relations between these actors 
(Yeung and Coe 2015).
 24?  In so doing, conceptualization on three competitive dynamics is offered, i.e. cost-capability 
ratio, sustaining market development, and working with financial discipline. Theoretically 
it needs to be seen how those competitive dynamics –considered as the independent varia-
bles (IV) where their existence varies geographically? interact with firms and non-firms 
actors in generating actor-specific or firms-level strategies (considered as the dependent 
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2.  Value Addition
Empirical research ground brought about by this GPN 2.0 frame-
works would need to go deeper into cases at firms-level strategies, indus-
try-level structures, and other stakeholders (such as particularly the host-
ing governments) specific strategies for investment promotion and 
industrial development. In the cases of ASEAN+3 automotive and elec-
tronics GPNs, the article is to showcase Toyota and Panasonic as a prime 
illustration of lead firms –originated from one of the +3 countries? en-
deavoring strategies for value-added in the two respective sectors or in-
dustries. At industry-level, a typical value chain structure of ASEAN+3 
automotive and electronics GPNs is featured to illustrate an early emer-
gence of the two sectors regional value chains.
Typical value addition activities at firms-level are depended upon 
firms and their suppliers and subsidiaries efforts in adding values of their 
production or manufacturing processes, range of products, product variety, 
differentiation, mixture of activities and application of skills and/or knowl-
edge in a variety of functions. In so doing, firms typically will go through 
all the way from their upstream business activities to the downstream 
sides by introducing series of efficiency, cost-cutting efforts and at the 
same time acquiring added values in their production sites/facilities, prod-
variables (DV) with their geographically specific manifestation). GPN 2.0 framework fore-
sees the following four different firms-level or actor-specific strategies in organizing GPN: 
(1) intra-firm coordination, (2) inter-firm control; (3) inter-firm partnerships, and (4) extra-
firm bargaining (Yeung and Coe 2015). With such a framework, GPN 2.0 would extend be-
yond the industry approach commonly found in the existing framework of value chain gov-
ernance to the micro-level analysis of actors or stakeholders seeking for industrial 
upgrading and local development, i.e. to include efforts to capture value added generated 
in the network. The micro-level analysis, which is also employed in this study, would catch 
specific responses of geographically situated firms and other stakeholders that are likely 
to adopt and pursue different strategies even within the same global industry, regional or 
national economy. The study –on which this article is based? therefore keens to further 
explore those firms-level/actor-specific strategies by purposely focusing on how they cap-
ture value added by taking the case of ASEAN4-Japan automotive and electronics produc-
tion network. GPN 2.0 framework complements existing GVC analysis in inter-firm gov-
ernance structures by identifying firms-level or actors-specific strategies in value addition 
activities at network formation stage and its industrial/territorial outcomes at the later 
capital accumulation stage. By so doing, it complements existing GVC analysis (such as on 
complexity and ?codifiability? of inter-firm transactions and technology and knowledge ca-
pabilities within the supply chains) by offering causal explanation of the surrounding com-
petitive dynamics and firms-level/actor-specific strategies.
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uct development, organization of their supply chains, and technological de-
velopment.
Originated from early GVC/GPN theoretical framework, conventional 
model of value addition activities at firms level emphasizes the differences 
of firms operated prior to the economic globalization (i.e. during the 1970s) 
and those operated after the era (i.e. in the 2000s). It maintains the idea 
that firms in the 2000s tend to be more efficient both in upstream and 
downstream activities making them to create more value added in the are-
as of R&D, design (upstream) and of marketing and services (down-
stream), while at the same time they tend to create less value added in 
midstream activities (especially in the areas of production and logistics). 
Firms in the 1970s therefore are considered as having less value added 
both in upstream and downstream activities, and tend to be dominated by 
production and logistics activities which make them not so efficient in cre-
ating added value. See Appendix 1 for an illustration of typical value addi-
tion at firm-level, a ?smiley curve? depicting the differences between firms 
in the 1970s and the 2000s.
Value addition activities are also typically apparent in the form of 
transactions among firms, suppliers and other stakeholders in GVC/GPN. 
Transactions are conducted in line with the levels of its complexity (Cx-T) 
and codification (Cd-T), and of the competence of its major suppliers 
(SC)25?. Typical value chains structure resulted from such transactions are 
defined based on their explicit coordination and power asymmetry levels 
where the higher they are, the more hierarchical, and the lower they are, 
the less hierarchical. Coordination among related stakeholders is conduct-
ed more explicitly in hierarchical value chains structure type rather than 
the market one. Relations among them hence tend to be more asymmetri-
cal when they are in hierarchical type than the one in market type.
The hierarchical structure type therefore is common within integrated 
firms where explicit coordination is of its core feature. The captive struc-
 25?  Cx-T represents complexity of transactions conducted by related players in the value 
chain, Cd-T denotes the level of codification of the transactions made by related players, 
and SC signifies the level of major suppliers competence in order to complete the transac-
tions. Five types of transactions are typically identified: (1) market where Cx-T is usually 
low level, but Cd-T and SC are high levels, (2) modular where Cx-T, Cd-T and SC are all 
high levels, (3) relational where Cx-T and SC are high levels and Cd-T is low level, (4) cap-
tive where Cx-T and Cd-T are both high levels, but SC is low level, and finally (5) hierar-
chical where Cx-T is high level, but both Cd-T and SC are low levels.
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ture type takes place where lead firms have direct control over their cap-
tive suppliers. The relational structure type indicates the presence of rela-
tional suppliers who serve mainly as intermediaries between the lead firm 
and its component and material suppliers. The modular structure likewise 
suggests the emergence of turn-key suppliers who have managed, at cer-
tain stage, to convert their roles and position from mere component and 
material suppliers. The market structure type eventually represents sym-
metric relations between the suppliers and their lead firm(s) and/or sub-
sidiaries, especially in terms of the use of market price as the sole mecha-
nism. 
Last but not least, strategic measures of host ASEAN governments in 
the area of investment promotion and industrial development are exam-
ined to stipulate legal and political economic environments confronted by 
the lead firms and their GPNs. In this article, cases on Indonesia, Malay-
sia and Thailand are offered in the context of initiating discussion on key 
policy issues confronted by relevant stakeholders in the network. The dis-
cussion comprises a concise and summarized assessment on historical and 
legal context of the policies, major key governmental agencies and other 
relevant stakeholders of the two sectors, and fundamental predicaments 
in delivering the measures and how policy adjustment are made.
F.  ASEAN REGIONALISM
The 1967 Bangkok Declaration marked the onset of ASEAN regional-
ism. It is then followed by series of treaties and declarations covering 
broad areas of shared issues, values and norms among ASEAN member 
states and their partners. Treaty of Amity of Cooperation (TAC) of 1976 
Bali Declaration is the major landmark that provides the basis for ASEAN 
cooperation in political security, socio-cultural and economic affairs. Eco-
nomic affairs cooperation was then being realized in 1992 Singapore Sum-
mit marking the initiation of trade liberalization under AFTA-CEPT 
agreement. In 2003, Tokyo Declaration witnessed enlargement of regional-
ization process, i.e. to include China, Japan and Korea under ASEAN+3 
EAS (East Asian Summit).
1.  Brief Backgrounder to ASEAN+3
Looking at those historical conjunctures, ASEAN+3 regionalization re-
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flects an intense and constant involvement of state/governments in its ar-
rangement. The early historical outlook of ASEAN formation is highly po-
liticized. It is appropriately explained in terms of the Cold War era 
marking the ASEAN national governments commitment to ?neutrality?, 
the term that is only nicely applied to the fields of diplomacy, but not to 
military, economy and political ones. Militarily-speaking, all of the five 
ASEAN founding countries are heavily depended and relied on the US/
Western powers since their successes in crushing Communist and other 
socialist forces domestically in the late 1960s onward. ASEAN economy 
was since then designed as parallel to the interests of the US/Western gov-
ernments and businesses. Politically, there is no room to maneuver for 
ASEAN governments beyond the US/Western model of developmental po-
litical regime –be it authoritarian, soft authoritarian, semi-democratic, or 
democratic. Their East Asian counterparts –especially Japan and Korea, 
but also later China? shared similar historical backgrounds.
Accordingly, ASEAN arrangement and its ensuing development in the 
fields of economy, politics and military is deeply influenced by intentions 
to keep on tracks of neutrality, economic development needs, political and 
military amity among neighbors (under the hegemonic power of the US), 
and non-interference conception on any domestic affairs. The intention 
would then have been manifested in the notion and practice of Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation (TAC). The TAC paved the foundation of the so-
called ?ASEAN Way? as a principle in solving disputes among member 
countries. This has ultimately been the major landmark in the enlarge-
ment of ASEAN. The membership of Brunei Darussalam in the mid 1980s 
constructed the ASEAN-6 that completed with the memberships of four 
additional Southeast Asian countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vi-
etnam) in the 1990s to form the ASEAN-10. Inter-regional dialogues be-
tween ASEAN and its partners open the way to broader regional arrange-
ment to include the +3 East Asian countries (China, Japan and Korea) 
that is ultimately peaked in the idea of EAC (East Asian Community).
2.  Southeast Asia in Contemporary GPN
Southeast Asian countries participation in GPN is directly linked to 
the +3 countries –in the neighboring East Asia? that are home for lead 
firms operating mostly under the region?s production networks. Share of 
East and Southeast Asia in the world manufacture trade, as a result, has 
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increased significantly during the past 25 years. East Asia?s manufacture 
trade export rises from 28.3% (in 1992-3) to 35.1% (in 2009-10) and its 
manufacture trade import rises from 21.7% (1992-3) to 25.7% (2009-10), 
while Southeast Asia?s manufacture trade export has almost doubled, from 
3.5% (1992-3) to 6.3% (2009-10), and its manufacture trade import has 
slightly down from 6.2% (1992-3) to 5.7% (2009-10) (Athukorala and 
Kohpaiboon 2013). Pioneered by Malaysia and Singapore, the region par-
ticipation in GPN dates back to the 1970s, especially in the ?network prod-
ucts? (parts and components, and final assembly traded within production 
networks) which now account for almost two thirds of the merchandise ex-
ports of Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines, almost half those of 
Thailand, and smaller but still significant share for Indonesia (Athukorala 
2015)26?.
Based on commodities traded (SITC), Southeast Asia?s network prod-
ucts export composition confirms heavy concentration of network exports 
from Southeast Asia in electronics and electrical goods (SITC 75, 76 and 
77) in particular, and semiconductor devices compared to total world net-
work exports. Automobiles and other transport equipment account for only 
9% of Southeast Asian exports, compared to a global average of 30%. At 
the individual country level, the composition of network exports from 
Thailand is much more diversified compared to the other countries. The 
striking difference between Thailand and Malaysia relating to the relative 
importance of automobiles within GPN is particularly noteworthy27?. For 
semiconductors, network exports are significantly higher for Singapore 
(44.6%), the Philippines (42.7%), and Malaysia (36.2%), compared to Thai-
land (11.4%), Indonesia (4.7%) and Vietnam (4%) as of 2011-12 (Athukora-
 26?  Shares of Southeast Asia network products in world manufacturing trade have also been 
persistently growing during the past 25 years. Share of the region?s parts and components 
export has doubled from 22.7% (1992-3) to 52.5% (2011-12), and its import has also in-
creased from 36% (1992-3) to 47.3% (2011-12). However, in the final assembly, Southeast 
Asia export share has declined quite significantly from 34.1% (1992-3) to 19.5% (2011-12), 
and its import share has dropped slightly from 18.4% (1992-3) to 16.3% (2011-12). The 
growing importance of Southeast Asian countries as suppliers of parts and components to 
final assembly activities within China-dominated production network needs to be pointed 
out, especially when it is compared with corresponding data of China. Over 22% of parts 
and components imports (2011-12) to China originated from Southeast Asia, up from 12% 
(1992-3), and share of parts and components in total manufacturing exports to China from 
Southeast Asia increased from 38% (1992-3) to 62% (2009-10) (Athukorala 2015).
 27?  See Athukorala and Kohpaiboon (2010) for deeper analysis on the two countries contrast-
ing policies over domestic automobile industry.
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la 2015).
The growing significance of Southeast Asia as parts and components 
trade hub is certain in the case of electronics, but also is suggesting in the 
case of automotive sector. As part of global and regional production net-
works, dynamic trade pattern among ASEAN4 countries in electronics sec-
tors have fostered them to involve in various types of parts and compo-
nents trade along with its network products, such as electronic integrated 
circuits and micro-assemblies. In automotive sector, despite the fact that 
parts and components (i.e. motor vehicles/motorcycles parts and accesso-
ries) trade value is still lagging behind final assembly (i.e. passenger cars, 
trucks and motorcycles) ones, there has been a steady increase in parts 
and components trade among ASEAN4 countries (especially between Indo-
nesia and Thailand, 2009-13). 
G.  ASEAN+3 MACRO-LEVEL TRADE SETTING 
Seen from a macro-level (empirical) setting, ASEAN+3 regionalization 
is signified by distinctive trade pattern and trend in value added that is 
generated from the two sectors intra-regional (within ASEAN) and inter-
regional (ASEAN+3) trading activities. ASEAN5 countries exemplify in-
tra-ASEAN trade, whereas ASEAN+3 represents trade between ASEAN5 
and the +3 countries. This section thus provide elaboration on the trade 
pattern and trends in value added of ASEAN5+3 trade in commodities re-
lated to automotive and electronics sectors. The analysis is based on sta-
tistical database and calculations provided by the UN Comtrade Database 
(2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015) and the WTO-OECD Trade in Value 
Added (TiVA) Statistical Database (2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011).
As previously mentioned, the following commodities under the Har-
monized System (HS) (applied in the UN Comtrade Database) and Stand-
ard International Trade Classification (SITC) (applied in the WTO-OECD 
TiVA Statistical Database) are selected: HS Code 87-vehicles other than 
railway, tramway, HS Code 85-electrical, electronic equipment, SITC 
C34T35-transport equipment and SITC-C30T33-electrical-optical equip-
ment. The following two sub-sections offers presentation on trade pattern 
(Sub-section 1) and trends in value added (Sub-section 2) respectively. 
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1.  Trade Pattern
In automotive sector, ASEAN5+3 trade nexus is led by Japan. Its 
main trade partners in ASEAN5 are Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia, 
traded largely in parts and components. Total trade value (2015) for HS 87 
between Japan (as reporter) and these three countries (as partners) is US 
$ 8,121,376,798, down from total value of US $ 13,079,062,700 (2013), but 
doubled that of China and the three countries total trade value for HS 87 
(US $ 4,080,945,878; 2015). As major partners, Thailand, Indonesia and 
Malaysia?s trade with Japan in the automotive sector is steadily intensify-
ing. Despite such a decline (since 2013 onward), key players in the indus-
try expect a turn this year as the last year?s trend shows a slight growth 
once again (Nakanishi 2015). Japan?s main export commodities are parts 
and accessories for motor vehicles (HS 8708) and its top destinations are 
Thailand and Indonesia. Its export of trucks (HS 8704) and passenger cars 
(HS 8703) is still substantial to Indonesia and Malaysia respectively. The 
country imports passenger cars and parts and accessories for motor vehi-
cles quite substantially from Thailand. 
Diagram 2: ASEAN+3 Automotive and Electronics Trade Pattern
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Japan?s trade with Thailand and Indonesia in parts and accessories 
for motor vehicles (HS 8708) is particularly in: (1) Transmissions for motor 
vehicles (HS 870840), i.e. export to Thailand at the value of US $ 
1,423,495,776 (2013) and Indonesia at the value of US $ 577,167,074 
(2013); and (2) Motor vehicles parts, nes./not elsewhere specified (HS 
870899), i.e. export to Thailand at the value of US $ 717,883,874 (2013) 
and Indonesia at the value of US $ 455,638,641 (2013). Thailand and Indo-
nesia are the major players in automotive industry among ASEAN5 coun-
tries. The two countries export and import activities in the sector?s com-
modities are solidly increasing since 2009, with more and more passenger 
cars and parts and components being traded between the two countries, 
exceeding the volumes that previously existed between Thailand and Ma-
laysia. Indonesia and Thailand trade is dominated by commodities under 
HS Code 8703, i.e. motor vehicles for the transport of persons (or passen-
ger cars).
In electronics sector, ASEAN5+3 trade nexus is led by China trading 
mostly in electronic integrated circuits (ICs) and micro assemblies. ASE-
AN5 leading partners of China in HS 87 are Singapore, Malaysia and 
Thailand (respectively based on the total value of trade in the last five 
years). Despite an increasing trend in 2011-2014, the total trade value (in 
2015) between China and these three countries for HS 85 decreases slight-
ly to US $ 74,097,150,426 ( f rom i ts 2014 tota l value o f US $ 
77,407,845,153).
China?s main export commodities are electronic integrated circuits 
and micro-assemblies (HS Code 8542) and its top destinations are Singa-
pore and Malaysia. Its export of electric apparatus for line telephony and 
telegraph (HS 8517) has been considerably large, i.e. to Vietnam, Singa-
pore and Thailand. Its diodes, transistors, semi-conductors, etc. (HS Code 
8541) export is quite substantial to Malaysia and Thailand. The country 
imports electronic integrated circuits and micro-assemblies (HS Code 
8542) in much more gigantic size (than its export) from Singapore and Ma-
laysia, while it imports electric apparatus for line telephony and telegraph 
(HS 8517) quite substantially from Vietnam and Singapore, and also di-
odes, transistors, semi-conductors, etc. (HS Code 8541) quite substantially 
from Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand.
To recap, in terms of export destination and import origin, ASEAN+3 
trade in automotive and electronics indicate changes in position of the +3 
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countries. Shifting positions are apparent particularly for Japan and Chi-
na. Despite Japan dominant position in the automotive sector (that is 
chiefly performed with its traditional partners of Indonesia and Thailand), 
China?s increasing role as major export destination is noticeable for Ma-
laysia and Singapore, while Vietnam also imports more and more from 
China and Korea in commodities under HS 87. China?s leading position in 
the electronics sector is evident as major import origin country for all 
ASEAN5. In the last 5 years, the country is the major export destination 
country in commodities under HS 85 for Singapore, and also lately (in the 
past 2 years) for Vietnam. The following Table 1reveals the more complete 
description of the +3 countries position. 
In terms of major commodities traded (HS four digits code), the fol-
lowing Table 2 outlines the trends for China and Japan in electronics and 
automotive-related commodities traded in 2011-2015 as previously de-
scribed.
Table 1: Position of the +3 Countries in ASEAN5+3 Trade 
in Automotive and Electronics-related Commodities (2011-2015)
Sector
ASEAN5
Automotive Electronics
Major Export
 Destination Country
Major Import 
Origin Country
Major Export Desti-
nation Country
Major Import 
Origin Country
Indonesia ?? ?? ?? ??
Malaysia ??* ?? ?? ??
Singapore ?? and??** ?? ?? ?? and??*
Thailand ?? ?? ?? ??
Vietnam ?? ?? and?? ?? and??* ?? and??
Notes:  *the trade value is increasing quite substantially over the years; 
**the trade value is increasing lately (particularly in the last two years)
Source: UN Comtrade Database (2011-2015)
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2.  Trends in Value Added
This sub-section highlights pattern of trade in value added of the 
ASEAN+3 trade nexus in automotive-related and electronics-related com-
modities (for the year of 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011) by featuring two se-
lected variables, i.e. the foreign value added (FVA) embodied in domestic 
final demand and the domestic value added (DVA) embodied in foreign fi-
nal demand. Domestic value-added content of export (DVA) is domestic 
content of exported products, while foreign value-added content of export 
(FVA) is foreign content of exported products. These two variables are se-
lected to measure a country?s GVC participation in world trade (UNCTAD, 
2013). Each of the variables presents embodied value added in trade 
among ASEAN5 countries, China, Japan, and Korea for commodities relat-
ed to the two sectors as described previously.
For automotive, as depicted in Chart 1 below, Japan-ASEAN5 trade 
produced considerably more FVAs and DVAs than the ones resulted in 
China-ASEAN5 or Korea-ASEAN5 trades.  Japan-ASEAN5 trade in trans-
port equipment generated much more FVAs than FVAs created between 
China or Korea and ASEAN5 countries. Japan-Thailand FVAs stood at US 
Table 2: Major Commodities Traded: China and Japan (HS 85 and 87, 2011-2015)
Top Export Commodities & Major Desti-
nation Countries
Top Import Commodities & Major Coun-
tries of Origin
E
le
ct
ro
n
ic
s:
 
C
h
in
a
1.   Electronic integrated circuits and mi-
cro-assemblies (HS 8542)??and??
2.   Electric apparatus for line telephony 
and telegraph (HS 8517)????and
??
3.   Diodes, transistors, semi-conductors, 
etc. (HS 8541)??and??
1.   Electronic integrated circuits and mi-
cro-assemblies (HS 8542)*??and?
2.   Electric apparatus for line telephony 
and telegraph (HS 8517)??and??
3.   Diodes, transistors, semi-conductors, 
etc. (HS 8541)????and????
A
u
to
m
ot
iv
e:
 
J
ap
an
1.   Parts and accessories for motor vehi-
cles (HS 8708)**??and??
2.   Trucks (HS 8704) and passenger cars 
(HS 8703)??and??
1.  Passenger cars (HS 8703)????
2.   Parts and accessories for motor vehi-
cles (HS 8708)??
Notes:  *The trade value is almost quadrupled than that of the export; 
**The most traded commodities are transmissions for motor vehicles (HS 870840) 
and motor vehicles parts, nes./not elsewhere specified (HS 870899)
Source: UN Comtrade Database (2011-2015)
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$ 837.81 million (2008) and US $ 1296.39 million (2011). Japan-Indonesia 
FVAs stood at US $ 951.62 million (2008) and US $ 782.51 million (2011). 
However, the largest FVAs are resulted from Japan-China trade where it 
stood at US $ 3107.19 million (in 2008) and peaked at US $ 5685.64 mil-
lion (in 2011). Japan-Korea and Korea-China trade FVAs are trailing far 
behind with the values that are comparable to Japan-Thailand and Japan-
Indonesia FVAs respectively. The total added value of Japan-China FVAs 
is five times more than the FVAs value of Japan-Korea, China-Korea, Ja-
pan-Thailand or Japan-Indonesia.
Chart 1: ASEAN+3 Trends in Value Added ~ Automotive (2011)
Source: OECD-WTO TiVA Statistical Database (2011)
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In terms of DVAs, ASEAN+3 trade in transport equipment captures 
the highest value in Korea-China trade gaining US $ 2803.45 million in 
2011. It is then followed by China-Japan (US $ 2276.11 million) and Ko-
rea-Japan (US $ 696.83 million). It means that, the added value of domes-
tic content of exported products in the ASEAN+ trade nexus is quite sig-
nificantly captured among the +3 countries. It is slightly different from 
the trend in the FVAs, as previously described, where the added value of 
foreign content of exported products is captured inter-regionally, i.e. in the 
case of Japan-Thailand (although the value is one fifth of that of Japan-
China). However, Japan-Thailand FVAs is slightly higher than that of Chi-
na-Korea. The prevalence of Indonesia-Thailand DVAs that has an added 
value of US $ 582.89 million in 2011 is worth noted since the value is close 
to that of Korea-Japan US $ 696.83 million.
Chart 2 below depicts that, for electronics, inter-regionally China-
ASEAN5 trade generated more FVAs and DVAs than the one created in 
Japan-ASEAN5 or Korea-ASEAN5 trades. The highest interregional add-
ed value created from foreign content of exported products is in China-In-
donesia trade. It has an FVA of US $ 1812.83 million (2011). The value is 
considerably higher than the one created in Japan-Malaysia (US $ 
1275.84 million), Japan-Indonesia (US $ 1218.04 million) and Japan-Thai-
land (US $ 1169.46 million). In terms of the domestic content of exported 
products, the highest interregional added value generated in the Malay-
sia-China trade that has a DVA of US $ 3489.27 million. It is followed 
closely by Singapore-China that has a DVA of 2507.66 million. Those fig-
ures further reinforce major shifting in the electronics industry and its 
GPN that China is not only leading in terms of trade, but also in terms of 
value added. Like the automotive (such as in the case of Indonesia-Thai-
land DVA), there is obvious evidence in intra-ASEAN5 electronics trade 
that creates significant added value, i.e. the cases of Singapore-Malaysia 
and Indonesia-China that has a DVA value of US $ 729.3 million and of 
US $ 634.01 million respectively (2011).
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Table 3 below records the complete dataset for both sectors? top 10 
FVA and DVA gainers. The dataset shows which country is gaining more 
value added as it trades with each respective partner in a particular sec-
tor. The findings are as follows: 
1.  Inter-regional (ASEAN5+3)
a.   Japan-ASEAN5 automotive trade nexus maintains its sub-
stantial capture of FVAs which means that Japan gains most 
foreign value added content of its export in commodities relat-
ing to SITC transport equipment to ASEAN5 (valued US $ 
2749.96, a sum total of Japan?s FVAs with Thailand, Indonesia 
and Malaysia, highlighted by * in Table 3, see automotive FVA 
column);
Chart 2: ASEAN+3 Trends in Value Added ~ Electronics (2011)
Source: OECD-WTO TiVA Statistical Database (2011)
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b.   China-ASEAN5 electronics trade nexus captures most FVAs 
which means that China captures most foreign value added 
content of its export in commodities relating to SITC electronic 
and optical equipment to ASEAN5 (valued US $ 4592.04, a 
sum total of China?s FVAs with Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand 
and Vietnam highlighted by ** in Table 3, see electronics FVA 
column);
2.  Intra-regional (ASEAN5) 
a.   Thailand-Indonesia automotive trade captures the greatest 
FVAs which means that Thailand gains most foreign value 
added content of its export in commodities relating to SITC 
transport equipment to Indonesia (worth US $ 394.26, indicat-
ed by *** in Table 3, see automotive FVAs column);
b.   Indonesia-Thailand and Indonesia-Singapore automotive 
trades capture most DVAs which means that Indonesia gains 
most domestic value added content of its export in commodi-
ties relating to SITC transport equipment to Thailand and Sin-
gapore (worth US $ 872.92, a total of Indonesia?s DVAs with 
Thailand Singapore, indicated by **** in Table 3, see automo-
tive DVAs column);
c.   Singapore-Malaysia electronics trade gains most DVAs which 
means that Singapore captures most domestic value added 
content of its export in commodities relating to SITC electronic 
and optical equipment to Malaysia (worth US $ 729.3, indicat-
ed by ***** in Table 3, see electronics DVAs column).
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Table 3: ASEAN+3 Trade in Value Added: Top 10 Gainers (2011, millions US $)
Automotive Electronics
FVAs DVAs FVAs DVAs
 1.   Japan-China 
(5685.64)
 2.   Japan-Thailand* 
(1296.39)
 3.   China-Korea 
(1102.49)
 4.   Japan-Indonesia* 
(782.51)
 5.   Japan-Korea 
(697.32)
 6.   Japan-Malaysia* 
(671.06)
 7.   China-Indonesia 
(638.32)
 8.   China-Malaysia 
(404.8)
 9.   Thailand-
Indonesia*** 
(394.26)
10.   China-Thailand 
(385.64)
 1.   Korea-China 
(2803.45)
 2.   China-Japan 
(2276.11)
 3.   Korea-Japan 
(696.83)
 4.   Indonesia-
Thailand**** 
(582.89)
 5.   Indonesia-
Singapore**** 
(290.03)
 6.   Malaysia-Thailand 
(281.02)
 7.   Thailand-Japan 
(244.13)
 8.   Indonesia-Japan 
(235.37)
 9.   Singapore-China 
(188.62)
10.   Malaysia-China 
(145.64)
 1.   China-Japan 
(19905.42)
 2.   China-Korea 
(3547.83)
 3.   Japan-Korea 
(2914.38)
 4.   China-Indonesia** 
(1812.83)
 5.   Japan-Malaysia 
(1275.84)
 6.   Japan-Indonesia 
(1218.04)
 7.   Japan-Thailand 
(1169.46)
 8.   China-Malaysia** 
(1095.09)
 9.   China-Thailand** 
(906.42)
10.   China-
Vietnam** 
(777.7)
 1.   Korea-China 
(15097.66)
 2.   Korea-Japan 
(3581.69)
 3.   Malaysia-China 
(3489.27)
 4.   Singapore-China 
(2507.66)
 5.   Thailand-China 
(1583.32)
 6.   Singapore-Japan 
(1134.1)
 7.   Malaysia-Japan 
(1028.59)
 8.   Indonesia-China 
(787.06)
 9.   Singapore-
Malaysia***** 
(729.3)
10.    Indonesia-Singapore 
(634.01) 
Source: OECD-WTO TiVA Statistical Database (2011)
H.  ASEAN+3 MICRO-LEVEL SETTING
At micro-level (institutional) setting, endeavor towards ASEAN+3 eco-
nomic integration is undertaken via strategic actions taken by firms and 
the hosting ASEAN governments in light of ensuing automotive and elec-
tronics RVCs. Lead firms (along with their suppliers and local partners/
subsidiaries) –as exemplified in the cases of Toyota (Box 1) and Panasonic 
(Box 2)? capture value added and hence endeavor value addition activi-
ties for efficiency at production sites, product development, organization of 
their supply chains, technological development and technical capacity 
building28?. Whereas hosting governments –as represented by cases on In-
donesia (Box 3), Malaysia/Singapore (Box 4) and Thailand (Box 5)? offer 
varied investment promotion and industrial policy schemes in response to 
dynamic changes in the surrounding automotive and electronics RPNs.
 28? See Arfani 2015 for more elaborate elucidation on how firms undertake the strategy. 
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1.  Firms Strategy
Assessment on value addition endeavors by firms is undertaken by of-
fering the following argument. In the automotive sector, as in the case of 
Toyota (see Box 1 below), the lead firm (Toyota Motor Corporation) en-
deavors to capture added values both in upstream and downstream value 
chain activities, its suppliers concentrate more on upstream, its local part-
ners/subsidiaries focus more on downstream. In the electronics sector, as 
in the case of Panasonic (see Box 2 below), the lead firm (Panasonic Corpo-
ration) focuses more on downstream value chain activities, most of its sup-
pliers incline more on upstream, while some of them are involved in down-
stream, and its local partners/subsidiaries tend to concentrate on 
downstream. As a result, in terms of value chain structure, the two sectors 
offer contrasting features where the automotive suggests an upward trend 
towards hierarchical network type and the electronics suggests a down-
ward trend towards market network type.
In automotive sector, lead firms have a common tendency main-
taining and moving upward to hierarchical network structure. This 
has been evidenced particularly in the areas of design, R&D and man-
ufacturing (i.e. in assembly) (interview 2015: Watanabe; interviews 
2016: Kohpaiboon, Tanaka, Sapta, Pongoh). The 1st tier suppliers have 
mostly served the captive roles in the chains. Companies such as Den-
so Corporation and Aisin Seiki are few instances of 1st tier captive 
suppliers that have been serving lead automotive firms such as Toyo-
ta Motor Company. The 2nd tier, 3rd tier suppliers and so on are mostly 
relational and modular ones, while almost none performs the market 
network type (interview 2015: Watanabe). Being subsidiaries/affiliates 
of the lead firms, local partners (which in most cases are local lead 
firms/conglomerates) tend to serve hierarchical roles in governing the 
value addition in some upstream-manufacturing activities for auto-
motive sector. Most local partners in automotive sector are active in 
downstream (especially in logistics and marketing) activities, i.e. by 
benefitting from their hierarchical governance value chain type.
Box 1 Hierarchical Network: Case on Toyota
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As previously stated (see footnote 13), the article refers ?electron-
ics? chiefly to ?consumer electronics? products categorization. Product 
range under this category includes: (1) In-house Consumer Electron-
ics (home audios & cinema, televisions & projectors, video players); (2) 
Portable Consumer Electronics (cameras, camcorders, media players, 
mobile phones); (3) In-car Entertainment and (4) Computers & Pe-
ripherals (desktops computers, portable computers/tablets/netbooks/
laptops, monitors, printers, etc.). Lead firms in this category tend to 
move downward, i.e. serving more towards relational and modular 
governance types, or even towards market governance (interviews 
2016: Kohpaiboon, Tanaka, Yamashiro).
Hierarchical structure type is less desirable and hence limited 
only to design and R&D activities by lead firms (interviews 2016: Ne-
Box 2 Market Network: Case on Panasonic
Apart from the Toyota Motor Corporation (TMC) robust global 
corporate profile and stable financial performance that is aspired to 
?making ever better cars?, intra-firm coordination and inter-firm part-
nerships have been conducted via joint ventures and subsidiarity with 
local partners, and solid business relations with suppliers, particular-
ly at the 1st and 2nd tiers (interviews 2015: Watanabe, Mitzuta; inter-
views 2016: Okabe, Tanaka, Sapta, Pongoh, Prasetiyani). In terms of 
upstream value chains activities, Toyota case offers expansion of man-
ufacturing sites, introduction and application of self-reliance mecha-
nism for ensuring product quality (i.e. by world-widely applied, stand-
ardized instruments and procedure, and further implementation of 
low cost automation machineries). Toyota downstream value chains 
activities incorporate mobilized and active local partners, especially in 
the area of personnel training or human resource development, after 
sales services and brand management. With such value chains activi-
ties, value added-ness in the case of Toyota is defined in terms of its 
both upstream and downstream activities (for the lead firm), more on 
upstream and less on downstream (for suppliers), and less on up-
stream and more on downstream (for local partners/subsidiaries).
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gara, Kohpaiboon). In production, manufacturing, logistics and mar-
keting activities, lead firms are more and more relying on suppliers? 
roles where the 1st tier serves as the captive, and many more 2nd and 
3rd tiers involve in relational, modular and market governance types 
(interviews 2016: Kohpaiboon, Negara). However, local partners in 
electronics sector are less engaged in hierarchical governance type, 
particularly in upstream (production/manufacturing) activities. Rath-
er, they venture more towards modular and even market governance 
types that cover not only downstream business activities, but also 
their upstream ones, i.e. to comprise areas such as design and R&D.
Consumer electronics market structure thus suggests a down-
ward trend (of industrial collaborations) where transactions among 
lead firms, their suppliers and local partners are generally signified 
by decreasing complexity, but at the same time by better codification 
of transactions and increasing suppliers competence. The case of Pa-
nasonic serves a parallel pattern. For its upstream value chains activ-
ities, the company maintains its existing production manufacturing 
facilities, by introducing and applying low cost automation machiner-
ies, and initiating and developing locally grown product design and 
development. At downstream activities, Panasonic maintains rigorous 
local partnerships, especially in sales and marketing.
Thus, for Panasonic Corporation, efforts to capture value added 
are defined in terms of more downstream activities as profit margin 
has become much narrower. For its suppliers, it is defined in upstream 
and midstream activities as they serve multiple procurers. And for lo-
cal partners/subsidiaries, it is more on downstream activities as mar-
ket has become much more diversified and segmented. Since the over-
all electronics regional value chains is structured towards market-
type transactions, suppliers (including the 1st tier ones) do not so 
much relied on the lead firm (Panasonic Corporation) strategies in 
value addition. They are instead adept to be part of the wider value 
chains encompassing diverse and competing lead firms.  As a result, 
the company?s problematic relations may arise, not only with their 
suppliers, but also with their local partners and/or subsidiaries (inter-
views 2016: Kohpaiboon, Tanaka, Yamashiro).
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2.  Policies of ASEAN Governments
ASEAN hosting governments attempt to devise their respective poli-
cies of FDI promotion and industry in response to the dynamic changes in 
surrounding GPNs, such as previously illustrated. In parallel to previous 
assessment, specific reference to automotive and electronics sectors is also 
presented with country cases of Indonesia, Malaysia (along with Singa-
pore) and Thailand. Case on Indonesia (see Box 3 below) features typical 
FDI promotion and industrial policy with domestically driven value 
chains. Case on Malaysia/Singapore (see Box 4 below) indicates further in-
tegrated FDI and industrial policy schemes –benefitting from geographical 
proximity? to capture value added-ness. Case on Thailand (see Box 5 be-
low) offers concerted efforts by relevant governmental agencies and stake-
holders in the two sectors to value chains immersion in FDI promotion 
and industrial policy. 
Indonesia FDI policy schemes reflect dispersed vision in terms of 
lacking integrated industrial development policies within sectors un-
der GPN. Its large domestic market further complicates its policy 
measures. It eventually leads to domestically oriented value added as 
also described in the previous section on Trends in Value Added (im-
plying that the country is oriented more on domestic than foreign con-
tent orientation of its value added). The country?s automotive* and 
electronics** FDI promotion and industrial development policy is de-
signed and implemented under Ministry of Industry (MOI) and Minis-
try of Trade (MOT) along with the Investment Coordinating Board 
(ICB) whose mandate is to coordinate works and functions of related 
government agencies responsible for investment services. MOI and 
MOT have also particular directorates that are designed to support 
value addition activities and upgrading for national or local players in 
the automotive industry –and in the case of SMEs, in coordination 
and collaboration with Ministry of Cooperatives and SMEs.
Value addition policy of both sectors is within the authority of the 
MOI?s Directorate General of Metal, Machinery, Transportation Tools 
Box 3 Domestically Driven Value Chains: Case on Indonesia
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and Electronics Industries, in terms particularly of products and 
parts and components standards, production processes and licensing. 
The MOI?s Directorate General of Small & Medium Industries is in 
charge of supporting and upgrading 2nd or 3rd and lower tier SME sup-
pliers in addition to the ones provided by Ministry of Cooperatives 
and SME. In electronics sector, Ministry of Communication and Infor-
mation (MOCI) regulates soft products of the industry, i.e. content of 
audio-video production and broadcasting agencies. In the context of 
supporting the industry to value addition activities, MOI, MOT and 
ICB are agencies dealing with hard side of the industry, i.e. in prod-
uct, process & functional upgrading of the industry. The soft side of 
the industry is anticipated mostly under the guidance of MOCI along 
with the newly established agency of Board of Creative Economy 
(BEKRAF). The latter is an agency in charge of developing blueprint 
for supporting creative economy, including the one related to the elec-
tronics industry.
Additional notes (Box 3 Domestically Driven Value Chains: Case on Indonesia):
*For automotive sector, Indonesia hosts approximately 700 automotive suppliers that are 
ranging from the 1st tier to the lower tier ones (interview 2016: Sapta). The 1st tier ones con-
sist chiefly subsidiaries of Japanese and other foreign principals and their directly-linked 
vital parts and component suppliers (which are also sometime categorized under the 2nd 
tier ones), such as Aisin, Denso, KYB, Aoyama, etc. The 3rd tier and lower ones are typically 
local by origin, i.e. home grown local companies/SMEs (interviews 2016: Soerjono, Tandiele). 
This type of suppliers is supported and supervised on a regular basis by MOI (Directorate 
General of SMEs Industry), Ministry of Cooperative and SMEs, and several supporting 
agencies, such as Indonesia Automotive Center and Indonesia Automotive Industry Associ-
ation (GAIKINDO).
**For electronics, Indonesia is home to some 235 companies in electronics and home appli-
ance manufacturing business, i.e. to include component makers (MOT 2014). Among the 
listed companies are local subsidiaries of Japanese & other leading brands: Panasonic, 
Toshiba, Sharp, Sony, Samsung and LG. Others are suppliers of parts and components that 
are listed either as FDIs, joint ventures (JVs) or fully locally owned companies/SMEs. The 
latter category mostly has businesses in medium and low-end products, i.e. audio-video and 
TV sets (including LCD & LED types), AC, refrigerators, washing machines, etc. (MOT, 
MOI 2016). Some FDIs and JVs have begun to manufacture/assemble selected high-end 
products and inter-sectoral upgrading.
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Malaysia (along with Singapore) pioneers efforts to connect their 
industries to GPN in Southeast Asia via particularly electronics sec-
tor*. Technological advancement of electronics industry in the 1990s 
that was coupled with worldwide information communication technol-
ogy revolution has affected the Malaysian electronics industry**. The 
2000s observed delivering bases of centers for value added activities 
in the areas of research, development and design (RD&D), brand de-
velopment, virtual manufacturing, customer service which also in-
clude beginning of local companies/suppliers SME to go global for sup-
ports of tooling automation in other parts of the world, especially in 
China, the Philippines and Central America. Malaysia is currently 
witnessing the presence of leading electronics makers or brands oper-
ating their operational headquarters (OHQs) and international pro-
curement centers (IPCs)***.
In automotive sector, Malaysia is fond for its national car policy 
following New Economic Policy (NEP) that has been successfully com-
bined with sound FDI policy for the sector –side by side with the suc-
cess of its electronics and wider manufacturing sectors*****. Prior to 
NEP, automotive assembly activities had been also the feature for 
both passenger and commercial car manufacturing and production 
during 1950s and 1960s. The industrial development thus followed 
the typical ISI (import-substituting industrialization) model. Major 
players were companies affiliated to or subsidiaries of American or 
European leading carmakers –and mostly owned by entrepreneurs be-
long to either Chinese or Indian groups. NEP subsequently inquired 
the shift in corporate ownership structures. As a result, during 1970s, 
Malaysian automotive industry witnessed major changes where com-
pany manufacturers, assemblers, and dealerships then shifted. Major 
development of the country?s industry then follows the commence-
ment of its national car programs under the brands of PROTON and 
PERODUA where the industry?s related stakeholders (Japanese lead-
firms, their local subsidiaries and suppliers, government agencies and 
other supporting agencies) respond to changes in production network 
and specific policy environment.
Box 4 Value Chains Complementarity: Case on Malaysia/Singapore
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Additional notes (Box 4 Value Chains Complementarity: Case on Malaysia/Singapore):
*The first attempt to connect with foreign investments were initiated by the state of Pen-
ang in 1971 when its proposal on Free Trade Zones (FTZs) development was supported by 
the Federal Government and enacted as the Free Trade Zone Act 1971. The proposal is 
modeled after the success of implementation of FIZs (Free Industrial Zones) in Taiwan and 
Korea. FIZs are home for approximately 1800 electronics related companies that make up 
the Malaysian E&E (Electrical and Electronics) industry encompassing a wide range of 
products and activities including computer and peripherals, optics, telecommunications 
products as well as providing services such as design of integrated circuits and prototyping 
(Yeow and Ooi 2009). The FIZ transformation began in 1970s (beginning of nation-wide 
semiconductor manufacturers with simple assembly operations capability and labor-inten-
sive feature (abundant low cost female workers), but with significant effect to the entire 
Malaysian manufacturing industry). The 1980s then witnessed expansion and moving up 
value chains of manufacturers with IC packaging capability and capital-intensive feature 
(via automation to generate advanced semiconductor packages: flip chip, organic land grid 
array (OLGA) packages, field programmable gate array (FPGA) and multi-leaded chips). 
The 1990s has further seen supporting high technology industrial development with IC 
wafer fabrication capability and technology-intensive feature (via setting up R&D and de-
sign centers, outbound overseas training of Malaysian engineers to world ICT centers in 
Japan, the US and Europe, SME suppliers full automation, deepened semiconductor pack-
aging development, manufacturing process development and design activities).
**Responding to the changes, some electronics and electrical (E&E) sub sectors moved up 
in the value chains, some others adapted by and integrated with the cluster/zones inter-
sectoral upgrading, while the remaining others stayed in the conventional medium and 
low-end electrical and electronic products (interview 2016: Negara, Tanaka). The Kulim Hi-
Tech Industrial Park (KHTP) in the northern state of Kedah –set up in 1996? was the 
first hi-tech industrial park. KHTP was home to 24 MNCs and 37 SMEs (2011) seeking for 
higher value added in the industry (Wulandari not dated).
***It includes the prominent Japanese and Korean lead firms, the strengthening roles of 
various types of local subsidiaries and suppliers in the E&E production network, and the 
bold industrial policy framework designed by the Malaysian federal and states government 
in collaboration with other supporting agencies from the academic, research and policy cir-
cles.
****The national car policy is designed under the country?s New Economic Policy (NEP) 
following the racial tension that erupted into a bloody riot in 1969. Under NEP, affirmative 
action programs to the Malay ethnic group were introduced in almost every sector of politi-
cal economic and social life (the so-called ?Bumiputera Policy?). Strategic economic sectors/
industries were then defined to include in the programs. Automotive sector is no exception 
under which such a policy corporate sector ownership is targeted to be composed of 30% for 
Malay, 40% for non-Malay groups (predominantly Chinese and Indian), and 30% for foreign 
by 1990 (interview 2016: Tanaka). The term Bumiputera itself denotes to Malay?s ethnic 
group who is predominantly Moslem and also indigenous ethnic groups in both West (pen-
insular) and East (Sabah-Sarawak states) Malaysia (Rosli 2006).
*****The Malaysian foreign policy has so far attracted leading multinational companies, 
particularly those of Japan origin since the promulgation of Investment Incentives Act of 
1968 and the establishment of the Federal Industrial Development Authority in 1967 (cur-
rently called as MIDA) (interview 2016: Tanaka).
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Thailand has detailed plan and policy measures involving a vari-
ety of sectors and elaborating tax and other fiscal incentives to be of-
fered to especially foreign investors. It is specified as ?super clusters? 
encompassing prominently automotive and electronics sectors indicat-
ing high and advanced development stage of the covered areas*. The 
country?s major GPN stakeholders in the two industries benefit from 
government active and progressive roles in the past 20 years (inter-
views 2016: Kohpaiboon, Abe, Okabe, Taguchi). In the electronics in-
dustry, relevant stakeholders variously define their roles and respons-
es, e.g. by emphasizing on production for domestic market segments, 
thus creating locally grown brands**. Captive 1st or 2nd tiers electron-
ics suppliers are struggling with competition from independent sup-
pliers (which are more flexible in supplying non-leading brands but 
with good market segmentation). This has made leading brands and 
their local subsidiaries (plus few local suppliers) to engage in limited 
activities in R&D and design, sometime in collaboration with their 
Malaysian or Singaporean-based company headquarters (interview 
2016: Kohpaiboon).
Automotive and electronics industries in Thailand have strong 
supports from research and policy circles. Major supporting agency in 
automotive research, advisory, consultancy and policy advocacy is 
Thailand Automotive Institute (TAI)***. EEI (Electrical and Electron-
ics Institute) plays significant roles since 1998 in promoting and sup-
porting the development and export of electrical and electronic prod-
ucts, as well as serving as a center of information for the electronics 
industry****. In addition to EEI and other related governmental 
agencies, R&D and design activities in electronics industry is also car-
ried out by lead firms, albeit its limited scope, such as the one initiat-
ed by Panasonic Corporation, i.e. the Panasonic Appliances R&D 
Center.
Box 5 Value Chains Immersion: Case on Thailand
Additional notes (Box 5 Value Chains Immersion: Case on Thailand):
*Administered mainly under the Board of Investment (BOI), the industrial zones classifi-
cation is based on particular developmental stages in which some areas are classified un-
der ?special economic (development) zones? or SEZs and some other areas are classified as 
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I.  REGIONAL VALUE CHAINS
Having explored firms? strategy in value addition and reviewed 
schemes of investment policy as presented in the preceding section, the ar-
ticle is to identify several key issues worth noted in light of ensuing re-
gional value chains of the two sectors. The issues shall be addressed both 
at domestic or national as well as international levels through particularly 
existing ASEAN integration institutional schemes. The following ques-
tions are therefore addressed: (1) how to link existing FDI and locally 
grown parts and component suppliers to the value chains? (2) how to es-
tablish common policy platform for advancement of RD&D, HRD, vocation-
al training and other technical capacity building activities among firms 
and other related stakeholders in the two sectors? (3) how ASEAN proceed 
with integrated regional industrial cooperation scheme?
targeted special industrial clusters as outlined in the government/BOI Cluster Policy or the 
cluster-based special economic development zones (SEDZ) policy. At the initial stage, the 
government targets to develop two types of clusters: (1) the super clusters and (2) other 
targeted clusters. Automotive and electronics sectors are both within the first category, i.e. 
the super clusters, along with several other sectors such as food and medical hubs, digital-
based cluster, and eco-friendly pharmaceutical and chemical cluster. The official terms for 
the automotive and electronics sectors are automotive and parts cluster and electrical ap-
pliances, electronics and telecommunication equipment cluster (BOI 2015).
**Such as in the case of air conditioner segment establishing local brand of ?Saijo Denki.?
***TAI is established in 1998 based on the Cabinet Resolution (July 7, 1998) and the Min-
istry of Industry?s Order No. 314/2541. The institute?s roles are to recommend strategic 
plans and measures for the development of the automotive industry; support the operation 
of organizations in both private and government sectors to achieve the defined objectives; 
coordinate with related organizations for mutual operational support; and provide neces-
sary services to manufacturers, such as product testing and inspection, training, and con-
sultancy. Its scope of activities includes research, productivity improvement, product de-
sign, research and technology development, standard and product testing, human 
resources development and database.
****EEI is autonomous agency under the Thai Ministry of Industry?s IDF (Industrial De-
velopment Foundation). Its principal roles are promoting the industry?s export via capacity 
building, promoting utilization of local raw materials, parts and components to increase 
value added of the products, promoting harmonization of Thai product standards with the 
international one, and supporting (local) product and brands development. One of its core 
activities is developing qualified and reliable in-depth database as a guideline for industri-
al promotion and development (EEI 2016).
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1.  FDI and the Value Chains
A functioning regional value chain would need a well-developed FDI 
scheme to be planned and implemented in individual ASEAN country. 
However, when confronting with value addition challenges, certain FDI is-
sues are elementary. In the case of Indonesia, for example, the question re-
mains on how the country addresses on exiting brown fields versus green 
fields FDIs. It is thus on how the country sees the future look of its overall 
FDI schemes. In the case of Malaysia, the bumiputera policy legacies lin-
ger the country?s FDI and industrial policy, especially on the automotive 
sector. It is a challenging question for the country on how the effect of its 
contemporary FDI promotion schemes would affect to its affirmative poli-
cy to local stakeholders. Nevertheless, the case of Thailand presents a poli-
cy measure that goes beyond conventional approach to FDI promotion and 
industrial policy. The policy has made it possible to immerse and mix val-
ue chains activities among local subsidiaries and 1st or 2nd tiers suppliers. 
The latest Thai strategic measure is centered on the ?super clusters? 
policy in which promotion of FDI production and industrial manufacturing 
is to be shared among different industries. It is generally set up for inter-
mediating roles of specific suppliers (such as in the digital-based cluster, 
e.g. digital GPS mobile equipment and application software) so that they 
could be plugged in multiple industries, such as automotive and electron-
ics. As a result of absence of such a measure, local consumer and home ap-
pliance electronic suppliers in Indonesia have to make no easy option of 
whether to endure their conventional positions as Original Equipment 
Manufacturers (OEMs) or alternatively to switch roles as Replacement 
Equipment After-Market Manufacturers (REMs). Super clusters scheme is 
also to anticipate abundant numbers in local automotive parts and compo-
nent suppliers in Thailand. A reverse situation applies to the Indonesian 
case where lacking numbers of local automotive suppliers is a major chal-
lenge for its future auto industry.
2.  Common Policy Platform 
In order to sustain, regional value chain needs common policy plat-
form that goes beyond national borders and cut across different regula-
tions. Malaysian case offers an effective pattern. As a result of the new au-
tomotive policy, the government (in response to its counterparts of 
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Thailand and Indonesia) sets up a policy platform in common and parallel 
to existing GPN. The country?s local automotive suppliers therefore have 
to be adapted to frequent shift in quality standardization. Long before 
such a move, in the electronics industry, Malaysia local electronics suppli-
ers have maintained their key roles in GPN, especially as part of the grow-
ing RD&D centers and services activities. As the largest market in ASEAN 
automotive, Indonesian policy makers aspire to develop industrial clusters 
oriented towards RD&D. The existing capacity is limited, but there are 
some good practices of local level RD&D centers. Thailand auto industry is 
in its path for technical breakthrough by outsourcing prototype 3-D design 
to local parts and component manufacturers.
In electronics sector (with specific reference to consumer electronics, 
home electrical appliance products), setting up a common policy platform 
are quite challenging as ASEAN countries struggle to adjust existing voca-
tional training and RD&D schemes. Thailand is looking for possibility of 
integration of existing college/university level internships program to the 
super clusters policy need. Indonesian electronics stakeholders discusses 
on where to put emphasis when technical capacity of its electronics indus-
try is to be developed. The concern (which is also shared by their counter-
parts in Thailand) is whether to stay at current value chains in consumer/
home electrical appliance manufacturing or to have inter-sectoral value 
chains shift, i.e. to initiate a wider RD&D orientation in its future elec-
tronics industry.
If the former option is preferred (i.e. staying at home appliance elec-
trical value chains), one possibility is to further link existing manufactur-
ing technical know-how to current practices of HRD and vocational train-
ing undertaken by many Japanese lead firms and supported by Japanese 
government scheme. In the case of Indonesia, linking existing curriculum 
of vocational colleges with the current Japanese manufacturing network 
in home appliance electrical products seems to be much feasible, by utiliz-
ing good practices from ?Kenshusei? alumni and widening scope of the ex-
isting HIDA (Japanese Overseas HRD and Industry Cooperation Agency) 
training scheme among others. Typical ASEAN consumer electronics in-
dustry capacitates engineers and workers at local firms, suppliers and 
subsidiaries by charting conventional style of management practiced by 
the lead firm (as in the case of Panasonic in Thailand and Indonesia).
If the latter option is preferred (i.e. by shifting the electronics value 
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chains inter-sectorally), the policy platform shall be an open and inclusive 
one, i.e. to attain international/regional expansion of industrial expertise 
and technical capacity, and inter-industry collaboration and standard har-
monization within the GPN. The Malaysian electronics industry puts for-
ward an illustration where expansion of local companies/suppliers net-
work in overseas training activities are participated by local engineers 
and managers acting as trainers for their overseas partners. Several Japa-
nese lead firms production networks in ASEAN5 applies similar pattern 
where engineers are transferred among factories under AEC industry ser-
vices-related harmonization schemes. Adopting lead firm?s production sys-
tem (such as TPS/Toyota Production System) is also preferable, i.e. in de-
signing on-the-job, in-house, vocational college graduate employees 
training in the wake of growing attractiveness of manufacturing employ-
ment.
3.  Regional Industrial Cooperation
In the context of institutionalizing current industrial collaboration 
practices, ASEAN devises several schemes in support of stakeholders? ef-
forts to capture value added in the two industries GPNs. Stakeholders are 
to take benefit from the schemes. Developed by ASEAN Secretariat in the 
framework of ASEAN integration monitoring (interviews 2016: Tijaja, 
Bakhtiar), the schemes offer the following possible utilization:
(1)   Utilizing beyond MRA (Mutual Recognition Agreements), especial-
ly in engineering sector services where the two industries are 
mostly in need of regional technical and engineering capacity 
building exchanges;
(2)   Benefiting from ASEAN Business Advisory Council (ABAC) activi-
ties and initiatives, especially for ASEAN Trade and Investment 
Centers (ATIC) which is initiated in the framework of ACIA (ASE-
AN Comprehensive Investment Agreement);
(3)   Developing the contemporary trade facilitation (TF) model on 
standards harmonization and conformance as outlined in the 
ASEAN Guidelines on STRACAP (standards, technical regula-
tions and conformity assessment procedures) - cosmetics sector as 
best practice;
(4)   Advancing ASEAN regional economic connectivity scheme, espe-
cially through existing regional value chains (RVCs) and regional 
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production networks (RPNs) – automotive and electronics as key 
examples;
(5)   Connecting to national focal points established in ASEAN member 
states in the framework of TF and non-tariff measures agreement 
– a case of ASEAN Single Window initiative.
MRA in engineering sector services provides a feasible launch pad for 
future cooperation among stakeholders in the two industries, especially in 
HRD and technical capacity building training and exchanges. ASEAN gov-
ernments and other related agencies are to design their training programs 
in parallel to the firms and suppliers actual need. Through ABAC whose 
memberships consist of prominent business and industrial representa-
tives, impact of future industrial cooperation could go beyond conventional 
inter-firm relations. Initiative on ATIC further provides a platform for de-
tailing regionally designed inter-firm relations at regional level that are 
adaptive to the current changes in the GPN.
ASEAN cosmetics industry is among one of the ASEAN Priority Inte-
gration Sub-sector (PIS) that offers best practice of regional industrial col-
laboration. In implementing harmonization and integration measures, the 
cosmetics industry stakeholders take the benefit of regionally integrated 
framework of product standards and regulation. They are at best utilizing 
the ASEAN member states harmonized framework in TF and other non-
tariff measures via ASEAN Single Window. Electrical equipment and elec-
tronics is also among the ASEAN PIS that needs significant boost in its 
harmonization and integration measures given its dominating regional ac-
tivities in RD&D, production, marketing, distribution and assembly of the 
many precision components that make up the final products. Although au-
tomotive is not in ASEAN PIS, the same effort should be at the stakehold-
ers? top concern. 
J.  CONCLUDING REMARKS
The article offers an argument that, as a regional economic integra-
tion scheme, ASEAN+3 trade is in parallel with ASEAN member countries 
deepening participation in the regional and global production networks. It 
presents dynamic trade pattern in which Japan and China lead in the au-
tomotive and electronics trade respectively. Thailand, Indonesia and Ma-
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laysia are the major trading partners of Japan in automotive sector. Singa-
pore, Malaysia and Thailand (plus also most recently Vietnam) are major 
partners of China in electronics sector. China-Japan trade captures most 
of the foreign content value added of exported products. Intra-ASEAN 
trade (as in Indonesia-Thailand nexus) is closely trailing behind in creat-
ing value added from foreign content of exported products. Value added 
that is generated from domestic content of exported products is dominated 
by Korea-China electronics trade. Interregional trade (particularly be-
tween China and Malaysia-Singapore) is increasingly capturing domestic 
content of exported products.
The article also suggests that firms and other relevant stakeholders 
in the two sectors benefitted from such a trade setting by advancing value 
addition activities. Changes in contemporary GPN implicate further to the 
firms strategy in capturing value added, how firms manage their relations 
with suppliers and local partners/subsidiaries in maintaining and develop-
ing value addition activities, and finally how they respond to the host gov-
ernment policies in the area of investment promotion and industrial devel-
opment. A hierarchical and market type value chain structures are 
discovered respectively for automotive and electronics. Finally, in terms of 
value addition activities, ?back to basic? measures are taken by firms 
(along with their supply chain and distribution networks) as they strive 
for efficiency not only in upstream and downstream activities (by captur-
ing value added in the areas of RD&D, marketing and services), but also 
in midstream activities (by also capturing value added in the areas of pro-
duction and logistics).
Such strategic responses by firms, suppliers and local partners/subsid-
iaries and the resulted value chains structures eventually define regional 
value chains of the two sectors. Several key policy issues are identified ac-
cordingly, i.e. to set forth domestic and regional talks on how ASEAN gov-
ernments, policy makers and other relevant stakeholders in the two sec-
tors define a well-fitted FDI promotion and industrial development policy 
options that are in line with the existing regional value chain structures. 
The talks are also set for policy debates on how governments establish 
common policy platform for RD&D, HRD, vocational training and other 
technical capacity building. And, last but not least, initiative for an inte-
grated regional industrial cooperation scheme should also be set on the ta-
ble. 
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Aiming particularly at initiating such an integrated regional industri-
al cooperation scheme, a couple of specific policy recommendations are 
proposed. First, as lead firms and other related stakeholders taking con-
stant efforts to value addition, ASEAN governments through their repre-
sentatives in the ASEAN Secretariat shall initiate a trade and industry 
?clearing house? to be located in a key industrial hub connecting ASEAN 
trade nexuses, such as Singapore, where major lead firms? operational 
head quarters (OHQs) are also located. The house deals with regional in-
dustrial cooperation that is to be implemented under and in good offices of 
the ASEAN Secretariat. Under the framework, the ASEAN trade and in-
dustrial representatives and policy makers are to be in constant coordina-
tion among themselves along side with occasional consultation with firms? 
representatives and other key business leaders.
Second, at national level, ASEAN governments are to advance collabo-
ration with the +3 countries? trade and industry associations and other 
relevant agencies in areas such as trade facilitation, FDI promotion and 
industrial development. As in the case of Japan, by detailing collaboration 
in the areas of industrial technical training, HRD and RD&D with agen-
cies such as JETRO (Japan External Trade Organization), JICA (Japan 
International Cooperation Agency) and HIDA (the Overseas Human Re-
sources and Industry Development Association), ASEAN FDI promotion 
and industrial policies will eventually be focused to the most relevant are-
as where value added are at its highest optimum benefits for ASEAN 
countries.
REFERENCE
Books, Articles, Reports
Ando, Mitsuya, and Fukunari Kimura. ?Fragmentation in East Asia: Further Evi-
dence.? ERIA Discussion Paper Series, 2009.
?. ?Fragmentation in East Asia: Further Evidence.? ERIA Discussion Paper Series . 
Jakarta: ERIA, 2009.
Arfani, Riza Noer. ?ASEAN4-Japan Trade Relations in Automotive and Electronics 
Trade Sectors: Trade Patterns and Trends in Value Added.? Ritsumeikan Kokusai-
kankei Ronsyu. Vol. 15, October 2015. 
ASEAN Secretariate (ASEAN Integration Monitoring Office/AIMO) and World Bank 
(East Asia and Pacific Region) . ASEAN Integration Monitoring Report A Joint Re-
Political Economy of Regionalism in ASEAN and Its +3 Partners?ARFANI?2017? 113
port by the ASEAN Secretariat and the World Bank. Public Disclosure Authorized, 
AIMO and WB East Asia and Pacific Region (Office of the Chief Economists), 
ASEAN Secretariate and the World Bank, Jakarta and Washington DC: ASEAN 
Secretariate and the World Bank, 2013, 163.
ASEAN Secretariate. Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme 
for the ASEAN Free Trade Area. ASEAN, Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariate, 1992, 7.
ASEAN Secretariate. AGREEMENT ON THE COMMON EFFECTIVE PREFEREN-
TIAL TARIFF SCHEME FOR THE ASEAN FREE TRADE AREA. ASEAN, Jakar-
ta: ASEAN Secretariate, 1998, 24.
ASEAN Secretariate and World Bank. ASEAN Services Integration Report 2015. ASE-
AN Integration Monitoring Office (AIMO) and WB East Asia and Pacific Region, 
ASEAN Secretariate and World Bank, Jakarta and Washington DC: ASEAN Sec-
retariate and World Bank , 2015, 169.
ASEAN Secretariate. ASEAN Integration Report 2015. AIMO (ASEAN Integration 
Monitoring Office) and POCS (Public Outreach and Civil Society Division), ASE-
AN Secretariate, Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariate, 2015, 159.
ASEAN Secretariate. ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA). ASEAN, Jakarta: 
ASEAN Secretariate, 2009, 125.
?. Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariate, 2011.
Bair, J, and G Gereffi. ?Local Clusters in Global Chains: the Causes and Consequences 
of Export Dynamism in Torreon?s Blue Jeans Industry.? World Development 29 
(2001): 1885-1903.
Balassa, Bela. Economic Policies in the Pacific Area Developing Countries. New York, 
New York: New York University Press, 1991.
?. The Theory of Economic Integration. Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 
1961.
Baldwin, Richard E. ?Stepping Stone or Building Blocs? Regiona and Multilateral In-
tegration.? Beijing: ECB and the People?s Bank of China, September 22-23, 2004.
Borrus, Michael, Dieter Ernst, & Stepan Haggard. International Production Networks 
in Asia: Rivalry or Riches? London and New York: Routledge, 2000.
Busser, Rogier, and Yuri Sadoi, trans. Production Networks in Asia and Europe: Skill 
Formation and Technology Transfer in the Automobile Industry. New York: Rout-
ledge, 2004.
Chaponniere, Jean-Raphael, and Marc Lautier. ?By Chance or by Virtue? The Regional 
Economic Integration Process in Southeast Asia.? In Bruno Jetin and Mia Mikic 
(eds.). ASEAN Economic Community: A Model for Asia-Wide Regional Integra-
tion?. Hampshire and New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016.
Cheewatrakoolpong, Kornkarun, Chayodom Sabhasri & Nath Bunditwattanawong. 
?Impact of the ASEAN Economic Community on ASEAN Production Networks.? 
ADBI Working Paper Series, February 2013: 44.
Coe, N M, M Hess, H WC Yeung, P Dicken, and J Henderson. ??Globalising? Regional 
Development: A Global Production Networks Perspective.? Transactions of the In-
RITSUMEIKAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS114 ?Vol. 15
stitute of of Birtish Geographers 29 (2004): 468-84.
Coe, N M, P Dicken, and M Hess. ?Global Production Networks: Realizing the Poten-
tial.? Journal of Economic Geography 8 (2008): 271-95.
Dicken, P, P Kelly, K Olds, and H WC Yeung. ?Chains and Network, Territories and 
Scales: Towards an Analytical Framework for the Global Economy.? Global Net-
works 1 (2001): 89-112.
East Asia Analytical Unit. Growth Triangles of Southeast Asia. Canberra: AGPS De-
partment of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Commonwealth of Australia, 1995.
Edington, David W., and Roger Hayter. ??Glocalization? and Regional Headquarters: 
Japanese Electronics Firms in the ASEAN Region.? Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers (Taylor & Francis, LLC), July 2011.
Gereffi, G, J Humphrey, and T Sturgeon. ?The Governance of Global Value Chains.? 
Review of International Political Economy 12 (2005): 78-104.
Gereffi, Gary. ?Commodity Chains and Regional Divisions of Labor in East Asia.? 
Journal of Asian Business 12 (1) (1996): 75-112.
Gereffi, Gary. ?Global Production Systems and Third World Development.? In Global 
Change, Regional Response: The New International Context of Development, by B 
Stallings, edited by B Stallings. NY: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
Gereffi, Gary. ?International Trade and Industrial Upgrading in the Apparel Commod-
ity Chain.? Journal of International Economics (Elsevier) 48 (1999): 37-70.
Gereffi, Gary. ?The Organization of Buyer-Driven Global Commodity Chains: How US 
Retailers Shape Overseas Production Networks.? In Commodity Chains and Glob-
al Capitalism, by Gary Gereffi and M. Korzeniewics, edited by Gary Gereffi and 
M. Korzeniewics. London: Praeger, 1994.
Gereffi, Gary, and Karina Fernandez-Stark. ?Global Value Chain Analysis: a Primer.? 
Durham, North Carolina: CGGC (Center on Globalization, Governance and Com-
petitiveness, May 31, 2001.
Gibbon, P. ?Upgrading Primary Production: A Global Commodity Chain Approach.? 
World Development 29 (2001): 345-363.
Henderson, J, P Dicken, M Hess, N M Coe, and H WC Yeung. ?Global Production Net-
works and the Analysis of Economic Development.? Review of International Politi-
cal Economy 9 (2002): 936-64.
Hoffman, Stanley. ?Obstinate or Obselete? the Fate of the Nation-State and the Case 
of Western Europe.? Daedalus 95, no. No 3 (1966): 862-915.
Hopkins, T K, and I Wallerstein. ?Commodity Chains in the World Economy Prior to 
1800.? Review 10 (1986): 157-70.
Hopkins, T K, and I Wallerstein. ?Commodity Chains: Construct and Research.? In 
Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism, by Gary Gereffi and M Korzeniewics, 
edited by Gary Gereffi and M Korzeniewicz, 17-20. Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press, 1994.
Huang, Hongwen, Mingxun Ren, Ping Lu, Richard N Mack, and Jianqing Ding. Chi-
na?s Booming Economy Is Sparking and Accelerating Biological Invasions. Vol. 58. 
Political Economy of Regionalism in ASEAN and Its +3 Partners?ARFANI?2017? 115
BioScience, 2008.
Humphrey, J. ?Industrial Reorganization in Developing Countries: From Models to 
Trajectories.? World Development 23 (1995): 149-62.
Humphrey, J, and H Schmitz. ?How Does Insertion in Global Value Chains Affect Up-
grading in Industrial Clusters?? Regional Studies 36 (2002): 1017-27.
Humphrey, John, and Hubert Schmitz. ?Governance and Upgrading: Linking Industri-
al Cluster and Global Value Chain Research.? IDS Working Paper 120, 2000.
Humphrey, John, and Olga Memedovic. The Global Automotive Industry Value Chain: 
What Prospects for Upgrading by Developing Countries. Vienna: UNIDO, 2003.
IDE JETRO and WTO. Trade Patterns and Global Value Chains in East Asia: from 
Trade in Goods to Trade in Tasks. WTO Secretariate and IDE JETRO. Geneva and 
Tokyo, 2011.
Intal, Ponciano S Jr. ?Deepening Trade and Production Linkages in East Asia and Im-
plications on National Policies and Regional Cooperation.? 6th Asia Development 
Reseacrh Forum 7-8 June 2004. Bangkok, 2004.
JAMA. Driving Growth towards the Future: Hand in Hand between ASEAN and Ja-
pan. Tokyo: Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association, 2013.
Kaplinsky, Raphael, and Mike Morris. A Handbook for Value Chain Research. IDRC, 
2000.
Kawakami, Momoko, ed. Repositioning Local Firms in GVCs: Perspectives from East 
Asia and Africa. Chiba: IDE JETRO, 2008.
Kimura, Fukunari. ?International Production and Distribution Networks in East Asia: 
Eighteen Facts, Mechanics, and Policy Implications.? Asian Economic Policy Re-
view (Japan Center for Economic Research), 2006: 326–344.
Kimura, Fukunari. ?The mechanics of production networks in Southeast Asia: the 
fragmentation theory approach.? IDE Kuroiwa Project on Economic integration in 
Southeast Asia: location of industries, production network (or value chain) and de-
velopment strategy. Prod. Keio University. Tokyo, 2007.
?. ?The mechanics of production networks in Southeast Asia: the fragmentation theo-
ry approach.? Center for Economic Institutions Working Paper Series. Tokyo: Cent-
er for Economic Institutions Institute of Economic Research Hitotsubashi Univer-
sity , 2007.
Kimura, Fukunari, and Ayako Obashi. ?International Production Networks in Machin-
ery Industries: Structure and Its Evolution.? ERIA DIscussion Paper Series, Sep-
tember 2010.
Kimura, Fukunari, and Yuya Takahashi. International Trade and FDI with Fragmen-
tation: the Gravity Model Approach. Tokyo, September 2004.
Kuroiwa, Ikuo, and Toh Mun Heng. Production Networks and Industrial Clusters: Inte-
grating Economies in Southeast Asia. Singapore: IDE JETRO and ISEAS, 2008.
Low, Linda. A Singapore Perspective of East Asian Regional Integration. NRI AT10 Re-
search Conference, Tokyo. February 3-4, 2004.
McKinnon, D. ?Beyond Strategic Coupling: Reassessing the Firm-Region Nexus in 
RITSUMEIKAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS116 ?Vol. 15
Global Production Networks.? Journal of Economic Geography 12 (2012): 227-45.
Nicita, Alessandro, Victor Ognivtsev, and Miho Shirotori. Global Supply Chain: Trade 
and Ecoonomic Poliocies for Developing Countries. UNCTAD Policy Issues in In-
ternational Trade and Commodity Study Series No. 55. New York and Geneva: 
UNCTAD, 2013.
Oikawa, Hiroshi. ?Empirical GVC Analysis in Electronics and Automobile Industries: 
an Application of Asian IO Tables.? IDE Discussion Paper No. 172, 2008.
Okabe, Misa, and Shujiro Urata. ?The Impact of AFTA on Intra-AFTA Trade.? ERIA 
Discussion Paper Series, May 2013, ERIA-DP-2013-05 ed.
Pietrobelli, Carlo, and Roberta Rabellotti. ?Global Value Chains Meet Innovation Sys-
tems: Are There Learning Opportunities for Developing Countries?? World Devel-
opment (Elsevier) 39, no. 7 (2011): 1261-1269.
Rabelloti, Roberta. ?Upgrading in Global Value Chains: The Role of Knowledge and 
Technological Capabilities.? Presentation Materials. UNCTAD, March 20, 2014.
Schmitz, Hubert. ?Globalised Localities: Introduction.? In Local Enterprises in the 
Global Economy: Issues of Governance and Upgrading, by Hubert Schmitz, edited 
by Hubert Schmitz. Cheltenham: Elgar, 2003.
?. Local Enterprises in the Global Economy: Issues of Governance and Upgrading. 
Cheltenham: Elgar, 2003.
Sharma, Subhash C, and Soo Y Chua. ?ASEAN: economic integration and intra-region-
al trade.? Applied Economics Letters (Routledge ) 7, no. 3 (2000): 165-169.
Smith, Adrian, Al Rainnie, Mick Dunford, Jane Hardy, Ray Hudson, and David Sadler. 
?Networks of Value, Commodities and Regions: Reworking Divisions of Labour in 
Macro-Regional Economies.? Progress in Human Geography 26 (2002): 41-63.
Sturgeon, T J. ?Modular Production Networks: A New American Model of Industrial 
Organization.? Industrial and Corporate Change 11 (2001): 451-96.
Sturgeon, Timothy J. ?From Commodity Chains to Value Chains: Interdisciplinary 
Theory Building in an Age of Globalization.? MIT IPC Working Paper Series, Jan-
uary 2008.
Sturgeon, Timothy J., and Johannes van Biesebroeck. ?Global Value Chains in the Au-
tomotive Industry: an Enhanced Role for Developing Countries?? International 
Journal for Technological Learning, Innovation and Development (Inderscience 
Enterprises Ltd.) 4, no. Nos 1/2/3 (2011).
Sturgeon, Timothy J., and Momoko Kawakami. ?Global Value Chains in the Electron-
ics Industry: Was the Crisis a Window of Opportunity for Developing Countries?? 
Policy Research Working Paper 5417, September 2010.
Surandam, Jomo K. Whither the East Asian Flying Geese? Prospects for Regional Inte-
gration in East Asia. Sir Patrick Gillam Lecture LSE, London. November 28, 
2005.
Toh, Mun Heng. ?Development in the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Trian-
gle.? SCAPE Working Paper Series No 2006/06, March 31, 2006.
?. ?Development in the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle.? SCAPE 
Political Economy of Regionalism in ASEAN and Its +3 Partners?ARFANI?2017? 117
Working Paper Series No. 2006/06, March 31, 2006.
Ueki, Yasushi. ?Supply Chain Collaboration and Responsiveness: a Comparison be-
tween Thai Automobile and Electronics Industries.? IDE Discussion Paper No. 
416, March 2013.
UNCTAD. ?Global Value Chains and Development: Investment and Value Added 
Trade in the Global Economy, a Preliminary Analysis.? UN Publication UNC-
TAD/DIAE/2013/1. Prod. UNCTAD. Geneva: UNCTAD, 2013.
USAID. Micro Links of the USAID. USAID. 2014. https://www.microlinks.org/good-
practice-center/value-chain-wiki/value-chain-governance-overview (accessed No-
vember 10, 2014).
Wattanapruttipaisan, Thitapha . ?Priority Integration Sectors in ASEAN: Supply-side 
Implications and Options.? Asian Development Review (Asian Development Bank) 
24, no. 2: 64-89.
Yeung, H WC. ?Regional Development and the Competitive Dynamics of Global Pro-
duction Networks: An East Asian Perspective.? Regional Studies 43 (2009): 325-
51.
Yeung, Henry Wai-Chung, and Neil M Coe. ?Toward a Dynamic Theory of Global Pro-
duction Networks.? Economic Geography 91, no. 1 (January 2015): 29-58.
Primary Data Sources: List of Interviewees
2015
1.   Mr. Takehiro Watanabe, Professor, School of Management, Institute of Business 
Studies, Chukyo University, Nagoya
2.   Ms. Yuki Mitzuta, Executive Secretary to the President Director, Aoyama Sei-
sakusho Co. Ltd. Japan (ASJ), Nagoya
2016
1.   Mr. Masato Abe, PhD, Economic Affairs Officer, Business and Development Sec-
tion, Trade and Investment Division, UNESCAP, Bangkok
2.   Mr. Ken-ichiro Okabe, Representative, Business Support Center in Thailand 
(BSCT), Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), Bangkok Office
3.   Mr. Yusuke Taguchi, Deputy Representative, AEM-METI Economic and Indus-
trial Cooperation Committee (AMEICC) Secretariat, the Overseas Human Re-
sources and Industry Development Association (HIDA), Bangkok Office
4.   Mr. Archanun Kohpaiboon, PhD, Professor, Faculty of Economics, Thammasat 
University, Bangkok
5.   Mr. Tsuneo Tanaka, Senior Advisor, JETRO, Kuala Lumpur Office
6.   Mr. Siwage Dharma Negara, PhD, Fellow, Yusof Ishak Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore
7.   Mr. Soerjono, Inspector General, Ministry of Industry, Government of Indonesia
8.   Mr. Yan Sibarang Tandiele, Directorate of Maritime, Transportations and De-
RITSUMEIKAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS118 ?Vol. 15
fense Industries (DMTDI), Ministry of Industry, Government of Indonesia, Ja-
karta
9.   Mr. Takenobo Yamashiro, Senior Director, JETRO, Jakarta Office
10.   Ms. Julia Tijaja, PhD, Director, ASEAN Integration Monitoring Office (AIMO), 
the ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta
11.   Mr. Arief Rizky Bakhtiar, Technical Officer, ASEAN Integration Monitoring Of-
fice (AIMO), the ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta
12.   Mr. Tonny Pongoh, Deputy Director, POLMAN, Astra International Tbk, Jakar-
ta
13.   Ms. Daysi Prasetiyani, Administration General Manager, PT Automotive Fas-
teners Aoyama Indonesia (AFD), Karawang
14.   Dr. Ir. Adjie Sapta, M.Si., General Manager, Chief of Corporate Planning Of-
fice, Chief of Corporate Social Responsibility Office, PT Toyota Motor Manufac-
turing Indonesia (TMMIN), Jakarta
APPENDICES
Appendix 1 : The smiley curve, typical value addition at firms-level
Political Economy of Regionalism in ASEAN and Its +3 Partners?ARFANI?2017? 119
Appendix 2: Diagrammatic Conceptual Framework

